Pakistan's Stabilizing Arsenal
The current global nuclear order is extremely fragile, threatened by North Korea’s expanding nuclear weapons program, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and Pakistan’s increasing instability.
To the Editor:
Based on hypothetical conjecture, Graham Allison ("Nuclear Disorder," January/February 2010) has fueled anxieties about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
Contrary to Allison's claims, international regulatory authorities have acknowledged the efficacy of Pakistan's comprehensive command-and-control structure, which has made the country's nuclear assets impervious to any threat, internal or external. Over the past decade, the Pakistani government has instituted many advanced security mechanisms, from tightened physical safety to technical controls on the nuclear weapons themselves. After the Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan was discredited for his illicit dealings, Pakistan introduced a multilayered, foolproof system of internal monitoring.
The presence of militants on Pakistani soil, particularly on its western border, might raise alarms about nuclear safety. But even the most cursory knowledge of how nuclear states maintain their arsenals would make alarmists understand that extremists could not possibly come to possess a nuclear weapon, nor could nonstate actors acquire such a device or the requisite delivery system. Moreover, the Pakistani army has recently carried out successful operations in Malakand, the Swat Valley, and Waziristan, putting the most feared extremists on the run and destroying their safe havens.
Pakistan stands committed to nonproliferation and disarmament and has taken effective measures to meet its international obligations. The government's wide-ranging regulatory instruments prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to any state -- including, contrary to Allison's implication, Saudi Arabia. In addition, Pakistan continues to cooperate voluntarily with the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding its civil nuclear program.
The international community should recognize certain facts about Pakistan's nuclear program: it is based on minimum deterrence and self-defense, it has come of age and is here to stay, it was initiated and developed in response to regional asymmetry in both conventional and nuclear arms, and it is now a source of regional stability. It is in the interest of regional and global peace that Pakistan be admitted into the fold of nuclear states.
IMRAN GARDEZI
Minister for Press, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C.
Related
There is no parallel in contemporary history to the cataclysm which engulfed Pakistan in 1971. A tragic civil war, which rent asunder the people of the two parts of Pakistan, was seized by India as an opportunity for armed intervention. The country was dismembered, its economy shattered and the nation's self-confidence totally undermined. Ninety-three thousand prisoners of war were taken, including 15,000 civilian men, women and children. Considerable territory on the western front was overrun and occupied by India.
Whatever its other consequences, last winter's brief war in South Asia broke the mold that since 1947 had cast India-Pakistan relations into a continuing confrontation punctuated by three military conflicts. Now, for better or worse, the subcontinent with its 700,000,000 people has been transformed into a ménage à trois, linking together three national members in new relationships.
India and Pakistan remain caught in a dangerous deadlock over Kashmir. Pakistan-backed terrorists continue daily provocations against India, and an increasingly frustrated Indian government feels that it has no recourse short of full-scale war. The only way out is for both sides to accept that their current strategies are not working and to start talking. And only the United States can help them do that.

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