Should I Stay or Should I Go?

Login or Register to leave a comment.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.

Snapshot

The Problem With Obama's Decision to Leave Iraq

Meghan L. O'Sullivan

President Obama has declared that all remaining U.S. troops in Iraq will be "home for the holidays." The move may fulfill a campaign promise, but it endangers Baghdad's future and undermines U.S. interests in the region.

In recent weeks, a number of deadly terrorist attacks in Iraq have highlighted the fact that even after seven years of counterinsurgency and stability operations, the United States still faces major challenges in realizing its long-term goal of establishing an Iraq that is, in the words of President Barack Obama, "sovereign, stable, and self-reliant."

Although these events -- including a series of coordinated attacks on August 25 that killed more than 50 people in 13 cities across Iraq -- underscore that security is still job number one for the United States in Iraq, several other factors will affect Washington's ability to work with Baghdad to preserve the security gains of recent years, build a strategic partnership with the government and people of Iraq, and shape and influence future developments there.

In transitional democracies, the second election often determines whether nascent democratic processes will take root and prove sustainable. Iraq's first parliamentary elections under its new constitution were held in December 2005 and led to the formation of the current government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The second elections were held in March 2010 and produced a draw; no single party received enough votes to form a government on its own, and none has proven willing in the seven months since then to make the compromises necessary to form a coalition government. Some U.S. officials have hinted darkly that continued political gridlock could inspire a coup led by military officers who are frustrated with Iraq's squabbling politicians (although a coup is unlikely to occur as long as U.S. forces remain in Iraq).

To avoid further instability, Washington is pushing for an Iraqi government that is "inclusive, representative, and accountable to the Iraqi people," according to U.S. officials in Baghdad. The U.S. government has also reportedly floated a power-sharing plan that would trim the powers of the prime minister and expand those of the Political Council for National Security in the hopes of speeding up the government formation process by increasing the size of the political pie that could be divided among the contending parties.

Iraq's immediate future will be determined by the country's elected leaders. And although the United States cannot compel them to form an inclusive government -- or even any government at all -- it can indicate that failing to do so will undermine U.S. support for the kind of long-term partnership desired by nearly every major Iraqi party (with the exception of the Sadrists, who reject such a partnership with the United States). That said, the status quo could continue for some time.

U.S. influence will be more effective once a new government is formed. Yet U.S. influence in Iraq is not what it was when Washington had billions of reconstruction dollars to spend (although, even then, effectively wielding this influence was often more easily said than done). Today, the United States needs to be more resourceful in identifying sources of influence, more focused in applying this influence, and more modest in what it tries to achieve with the influence it still commands.  

The United States still retains the authority to bring Iraqis together to resolve problems and is uniquely positioned to help Iraq normalize its ties with its Arab neighbors and the international community. Moreover, many Iraqi military officers believe that their country needs the kind of close security relationship with the United States that has brought stability to other Arab countries. This provides Washington with a card to play in dealing with Iraq's political leadership.

Perhaps the greatest potential source of U.S. influence in Iraq is the fear that many Iraqis harbor about their country's future. Many see a relationship with the United States as the only insurance policy against a return of sectarian militias and al Qaeda in Iraq, government repression and unilateralism (for example, on the issue of disputed internal boundaries), a military coup, a Baathist revival, or undue Iranian influence. But translating this influence into tangible political results will remain difficult -- as even Tehran's diplomats, who have failed to achieve several of their major objectives in Iraq, have learned.

Washington's ability to influence developments in Iraq will be further complicated by the civilian drawdown that has accompanied the U.S. military drawdown. Even as the U.S. embassy in Baghdad has assumed the lead in representing U.S. interests in Iraq, it has reduced its footprint in the provinces. The number of provincial reconstruction teams dropped from 23 in 2009 to 16 this year; over the course of 2011, those teams will morph into just two temporary embassy branch offices in Mosul and Kirkuk, which will remain open for three to five years before themselves closing, and two permanent consulates in Erbil and Basra. As a result, the United States is losing critical situational awareness, potentially leaving the embassy in Baghdad dangerously in the dark on developments in the provinces. Moreover, the unsettled security situation in several critical provinces is likely to continue to constrain the freedom of movement of U.S. diplomats, further exacerbating this problem.  

As a result of having spent seven years on the ground and carefully cultivating relationships with major local leaders, the U.S. military possesses a wealth of information regarding Iraqi society and local politics. This knowledge and these relationships are critical to the future U.S. role in Iraq and need to be transferred to the U.S. diplomatic team -- although it is unclear whether this is happening to the extent that is desirable.