Palestinian leaders first embraced armed struggle and then turned to negotiations. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad has now initiated a third, pragmatic stage of Palestinian nationalism by building institutions and counting down to statehood. Fayyad's vision is a promising one, and Israel should help him achieve it.
ROBERT M. DANIN is Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He headed the Jerusalem mission of Quartet Representative Tony Blair from April 2008 to June 2010 and served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2005 to 2008 and Director for the Levant and Israeli-Palestinian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council from 2003 to 2005.
A standing army in the West Bank will not keep Israelis safe. But a multilateral security agreement could.
For better or worse, this week’s unity agreement between Fatah and Hamas would never have occurred had the ongoing Arab uprisings not changed both parties’ political fortunes.
Whoever replaces Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad will have to commit to one of two strategies: winning domestic favor through confrontation with Israel or winning desperately needed Western support through cooperation. For years, the West Bank leadership has tried to straddle the two and, in turn, has born all the costs of both strategies while reaping none of the benefits.
This past September, as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sat down in Washington to dine with U.S. President Barack Obama, a barely noticed event took place in Ramallah. With little fanfare, the 13th Palestinian Authority (PA) government, headed by Salam Fayyad, issued its one-year countdown to independence. This brief and understated document is likely to prove far more significant for the future of Palestine than the White House dinner and reflects nothing short of a revolutionary new approach to Palestinian statehood.
For nearly a century, "armed struggle" was the dominant leitmotif of the Palestinian nationalist movement. This strategy was supplemented and ostensibly replaced by peace negotiations after the Oslo accords of 1993. The newest approach, adopted by Prime Minister Fayyad, a U.S.-educated former International Monetary Fund (IMF) economist, signifies the rise of a third and highly pragmatic form of Palestinian nationalism. Fayyad's strategy is one of self-reliance and self-empowerment; his focus is on providing good government, economic opportunity, and law and order for the Palestinians -- and security for Israel by extension -- and so removing whatever pretexts may exist for Israel's continued occupation of the Palestinian territories. Fayyad's aim is to make the process of institution building transformative for Palestinians, thereby instilling a sense that statehood is inevitable. Elegant in its simplicity and seemingly unassailable in its reasonableness, this third way -- dubbed "Fayyadism" by some Western observers -- has nevertheless precipitated serious opposition. Some Palestinians fear Fayyad is only making life better under Israel's occupation, Israelis accuse him of becoming increasingly confrontational, and a growing number of international democracy advocates blame him for Palestinian political paralysis...
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
The Oslo accord has failed. Battered by a wave of fundamentalist terrorism, Israelis are ready to elect a hard-line Likud government, while many frustrated Palestinians are spurning the PLO in favor of the Islamic extremists of Hamas. Locked in a political embrace, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin are dragging each other down. The process may stagger on, but it will never yield peace.
The current turmoil in the Gaza Strip represents the most serious challenge to Yasir Arafat's authority in decades. Israel's planned disengagement from Gaza brought to a boil long-simmering tensions among Palestinian factions demanding a change in the status quo. Holding national elections before the pullout may be the only way to avoid chaos and save any chance at Middle East peace.
Faced with spiraling bloodshed between Israelis and Palestinians, many observers think the only hope now is for a cease-fire followed by incremental talks. In fact, the opposite is true. Interim solutions will never work, and the time has come for outsiders to put forward a comprehensive plan for a final settlement.
