Hezbollah has long relied on foreign patrons for funding. But with Iran's economy suffering and Syria in turmoil, the group has adopted mafia tactics to fill its coffers. Western countries should shine a spotlight on Hezbollah's crime wave in order to hurt the group's reputation and undermine its support.
MATTHEW LEVITT is Director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Affairs. He is the author of the forthcoming book Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's “Party of God.”
In June, Lebanon’s new prime minister, Najib Mikati, announced the formation of a government dominated by members and allies of the Shiite terrorist organization Hezbollah. The creation of the new government has made Hezbollah the most dominant political force in Lebanon just six years after the “Cedar Revolution,” which placed the group on the defensive and forced its Syrian patrons to leave the country. With control of the Lebanese government, a vast social-service network, an army of soldiers and operatives, and an arsenal of more than 40,000 rockets, Hezbollah has arguably never been more powerful.
Hezbollah would not have achieved its current stature without the assistance of its creator and chief sponsor, Iran. Since founding Hezbollah in 1982, Iran has armed, funded, and trained the organization, transforming it into a potent terrorist and fighting force. Yet Hezbollah has not relied entirely on Iran to finance its operations. Instead, it has raised funds through criminal activities, including counterfeiting currencies and goods, credit-card fraud, and money laundering. In 2002, for example, Hezbollah operatives in North Carolina were convicted for smuggling cigarettes across state lines and sending a significant portion of their profits -- estimated to be more than $1.5 million -- back to their commanders in Lebanon...
Related
To defeat piracy in centuries past, governments pursued a more active defense at sea and a political solution on land. The current piracy epidemic off the coast of East Africa requires many of the same tactics.
Two and a half years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan is once more lapsing into bloody chaos. Although President Hamid Karzai is strong on paper, he is weak in fact. The drug trade is surging, the Taliban are creeping back, and real power rests in the hands of the country's many warlords. Instead of disarming the militias, Washington is using them to hunt the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban. But ordinary Afghans are paying the price.
Colombia is waging a war on two fronts: against guerrillas and against drugs. The former cannot be won on the battlefield alone. If the current peace talks fail, the country will plunge into all-out chaos. So the United States needs to take Colombia off the back burner and work with its government to help tamp down the violence, limit the drug lords' clout, lower the demand for drugs abroad, and prod the peace process along. Without these steps, even billions in U.S. aid will not be enough.
