By the Treaty of Lausanne Greece cedes to Turkey the disputed district of Karagach, west of the Maritsa River, with a population of 16,700 people, most of them refugees from Western Thrace. The Turks thus get the Karagach railway station which serves Adrianople. The new frontier is shown by a broken line on the two accompanying maps.
Turkish control over this link of the railway running down to the Aegean is of less consequence to the Greeks themselves--since it will interfere only with a small local traffic--than it is to the Bulgarians. The latter now find the free outlet to the sea for which they are clamoring blocked by Turkey as well as by Greece.
Karagach was retained by the Turks in the final treaty of peace made with Bulgaria in 1913 following the Balkan Wars. The Bulgarians demanded and obtained it in 1915 before they would enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. Since 1918 it has been an object of dispute. Its cession at Lausanne, against which the Bulgarians have protested vigorously, was a shrewd move on the part of Venizelos for it deflects Bulgarian grievances and pressure in no small measure from the Greeks to the Turks.


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Greece is adopting a more internationalist outlook, and Turkey will have to follow suit if it wants to be part of Europe. Business ties between the two are a good start.
FOR many years after the tiny new Greek state came into existence in 1828 it was unable in the nature of things to pursue a policy dedicated to the maintenance of peace. Its main aim had to be to liberate from the Ottoman yoke all the many regions where the Greek element was in an overwhelming majority. Only later could peace and security become its main objectives. At the time, the very raison d'être of its existence compelled it to become the nucleus of a national commonwealth wherein the whole Greek race could be reassembled and unified.
From history, climate, the cultivation of the olive and other aspects of a common civilization, the Mediterranean region has a certain unity. One can see it on the map. Yet it is too much a part of Europe, too much a part of the larger strategic concerns of non-Mediterranean powers, too diverse in the nations which encircle its waters, to constitute a subject of specifically regional politics, economics or security. A Tunisian foreign minister may call plaintively for a Mediterranean freed from the presence of superpower navies. A Soviet leader may float a suggestion for its denuclearization. A Yugoslav may propose a system of Mediterranean security to complete the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A president of France may speak of a community stemming from his nation's historic and cultural ties with nations on both sides of the inland sea. Such proposals have had an occasional echo. But the Mediterranean area is not ready for a big international conference on security, for a negotiated set of principles of coexistence, or for the withdrawal of American and Soviet naval forces. Everyone sees a crisis there, but none agree on its description and no regional solution, no regional procedure for getting a solution, is at hand.

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