EDWARD P. WARNER, Professor of Aeronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; former Technical Assistant in Europe for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
THE conflicts of armies have left their mark across history from the plains of Marathon to the woods of the Argonne. Sea power has guided the course of nations, often dominant over all other factors, from Salamis to Jutland. To war by land and sea we have added combat in a third element, more dreadful in its potentialities than either of the older forms, warfare in the air. The late European war offered but a foretaste of what may come when things that were the imaginings of fictionists a decade and a half ago are realized in grim truth and great forces soar aloft to batter each other in the skies, raining death and destruction on the earth below. The picture is not one to contemplate with calmness, and men react to it according to their various habits of thought. Some seek to develop defense against aircraft, others seek defense against war.
To analyze the activities of the first group would be to risk becoming a partisan in the dispute long and bitterly waged between the believers in the supremacy of the capital ship and those who uphold the merits of its foes below and above the surface of the water.
No one, strong though his belief in the capital ship or in the infantryman may be, denies to aircraft a place of first-rate importance in the warfare of the future, whether conducted primarily on land or at sea. The place may or may not be one of supremacy so clear as to render other factors relatively unimportant; but all are agreed that, as between two armies or navies even approximately of the same class at the surface, clear control of the air would decide the issue. It is in the air that the military rivalries of the Powers are now developing most rapidly and most dangerously...
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IN THE disarmament equation aviation is still a factor x. It is still preëminent among the difficulties, and so among the obstructions to success on a comprehensive front. In 1932, as on every other occasion since the World War when the matter of arms limitation has received concerted attention, the technical problems of the air arm are the most baffling that have to be solved. In air forces there are no universal units of measurement. There is no sharp distinction between one type of aircraft and another such as can be drawn, for example, between battleships and cruisers.
Fueled by dramatic economic growth, the nations of East and Southeast Asia are engaged in an arms race that shows every sign of accelerating. These countries are importing not only complex weapon systems but, more important, the technology with which to manufacture them. Since longstanding territorial and border disputes remain (most notably in the South China Sea) and the twin threats of China and Japan loom large, the potential for conflict is great. Without arms control and regional security measures, the Pacific Rim could one day be the site of a major conflagration.
THREE new and powerful weapons of warfare were developed in the World War -- aëroplanes, gas and submarines. It is fortunate for the world that two of these -- aëroplanes and gas -- are bound up with the development of the industries of the world. It is axiomatic that every effort should be made to prevent war; but if war cannot be prevented, then it is very much better for the world that when it comes it should be fought with weapons that have not required an immense outlay of funds during years of peace.

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