NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT, of the editorial staff of the New York Times
THE chaotic conditions in China during the last few years have obscured the changes that have taken place in the old rivalry between the Russians and the British for power in the Far East. Prior to the Great War, the Russian Imperial Government sought to consolidate its political influence in North China without interfering with British commercial interests. In the background of Russia's China policy, however, was the hope of ultimately displacing British supremacy in Asia. It is not unlikely that the Tsar's ministers thought of him as the logical heir of the Mongol Emperors. Great Britain, confident in her great political and naval strength, was willing to confine herself to extending and consolidating her commercial hold in China, as long as Russia did not interfere with this by bringing political pressure to bear on China. In matters political, Great Britain sought to check Russia only in her attempted advance on India from the north.
The World War temporarily eclipsed Russia in China. She lost all her special privileges and concessions, including the Russian section of the foreign city at Tientsin. She also lost the rights of extra-territoriality throughout the republic. Great Britain's trade in the meantime increased largely, and her principal political concern was to see that Japan did not become too powerful on the Asiatic mainland. This policy, according to some of the British on the China coast, was rendered more difficult by the expiration of the Anglo-Japanese alliance with the signature of the Four-Power Treaty at the Washington Conference. There is a growing opinion among the British in China that Great Britain made a serious error in relinquishing the influence over Japan which the Anglo-Japanese alliance gave her...
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IN TIME of war, strategy provides the means for implementing policy. Unified strategy between allies, then, is dependent for its effectiveness upon unified policy. This was overlooked in the Allied preparations before the war of 1914-1918. The nature of the Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France precluded political preparation. It was not an offensive or defensive alliance but merely, as its name implied, a friendly understanding concerning matters in spheres where the interests of the two countries met.
ANY attempt to specify authoritatively the most important military decisions of the Second World War would require too much by way of preliminary definition to be possible in reasonably short compass. Yet to join together, however sketchily, some of the events which to one individual marked the general pattern of the war may induce other more serious efforts and possibly provoke a reappraisal of some events heretofore overlooked or taken for granted.
DEFEAT in war invariably brings in its wake an avalanche of apologetic writing by the losers. The leaders of the vanquished nation are intent on exonerating themselves; men of action, military and political, who made history without much thought of how it would be written, suddenly become concerned about the opinions of posterity. A debate, for the most part quite unedifying, begins at once and is apt to continue far beyond the point where it is of interest to any but historians.

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