Downing Street and Arab Potentates

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THE pacts of amity between the British Government and Sultan Ibn Saud, recently concluded at Bahra through Sir Gilbert Clayton, and the treaties subsequently concluded with the Imam Yahia of the Yemen, will not fail to leave their impress upon the development of Great Britain's future policy in the Middle East. Until now that policy has undergone numerous transformations without ever assuming a definite conclusive shape. Superficially, the Bahra agreements represent nothing unusual in the diplomatic relations between England and Arabia. They have long been under consideration by the Arab experts of Downing Street, and Sir Gilbert Clayton, late Chief Secretary to the Government of Palestine, was only responsible for putting into technical shape and wording what had been achieved through a protracted negotiation. But having been concluded at an historic hour to the movement of Arab independence, as well as to the consolidation of the Middle Eastern policy of Great Britain, these agreements are a landmark of great consequence in a complex diplomatic chapter.

When Great Britain assumed responsibilities for the new Middle Eastern Empire, public opinion, as well as expert political opinion, was very much divided as to the merits of the fresh imperial burden. Two schools were predominant. On the one hand were the experts, most of them Tory in their political philosophy, whose most authoritative spokesmen were Colonel Lawrence and Miss Gertrude Bell. They maintained that a policy of annexation, whether disguised or outspoken, was not in accord either with the spirit of the Mandate or indeed with the dictates of British realpolitik. From the very outset they demanded a larger measure of true independence for the newly created Arab kingdoms and Emirates. They were most of them personally responsible for the new acquisitions and commitments, and, apart from the ethical issue involved in giving pledges solemnly and withdrawing them quietly, they foresaw a constant decline in British prestige in the East if the pledges were to be unconditionally violated. The other influential section of opinion, including many Liberals, deemed the grant of any protection without direct or indirect annexation an unjustified extravagance, an imperial burden which Britain could ill afford to undertake on the morrow of the World War...