VICTOR CHERNOV, Russian Social-Revolutionary writer; Minister of Agriculture in the Kerensky Government
THE conflict within the Russian Communist Party has entered upon a new phase. For the first time all the groups of the Opposition have made an attempt to unite and to create a common platform. At the head of this Opposition bloc are nearly all of the most prominent names in the Bolshevik Party: Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Sokolnikov, Shliapnikov, Kollontai, Piatakov, Preobrazhensky, Osinsky, and others. As against these names the party majority can set only those of Bukharin, Stalin, Rykov, and Tomsky. In addition, the Opposition has its unassuming rank and file, and not a few sympathizers who, like Lashevich and Belenky, form secret organizations, apparently acting on their own responsibility and risk. When such sympathizers are apprehended and brought before the highest party tribunals, they conduct themselves with just the same stubborn secretiveness as did the old-time Russian revolutionists before the Tsarist courts.
Only a few at a time did these leaders drop out of the ruling majority group and join the Opposition. At first, for instance, all of them, from Trotsky to Sokolnikov, together with the present leaders of the party, struggled against Shliapnikov and Kollontai; then all, from Zinoviev to Kamenev, unanimously agreed to have Trotsky removed from power and Radek disciplined; and, finally, the turn came for Zinoviev and Kamenev themselves to be cast from power. Hence, the leaders of the Opposition could not easily forget the bitter struggles within their own ranks and overcome feelings of antagonism and hostility toward each other; it was even more difficult to work out a definite program.
If we examine carefully the history of these defections, schisms, and desertions to the ranks of the Opposition, if we analyze one by one the factions of the Opposition, now united, we find that they can all be brought under one category. The Opposition personifies Bolshevik romance coming into conflict with everyday reality, and suffering thereby one defeat after another...
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