Some Misconceptions About Disarmament
ALLEN W. DULLES, former chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department, delegate to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1926
THE spectacular achievement of the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 in reaching an agreement -- almost over night -- on methods of naval limitation, has tended to create the impression, in this country at least, that the entire problem of armaments could likewise be promptly disposed of if a conference were called to deal with the subject. Unfortunately, the solution is not so simple. Many of the factors which made possible the success of the Washington Conference are no longer present and the mathematical standards used to measure naval tonnage are of little value when applied to human beings and their capabilities as combatant forces or to the intricate and diverse elements which make up the sum total of a nation's military establishment.
At the very outset one finds a difference of opinion between the Powers as to the method of dealing with the problems of a general limitation of arms. The European continental Powers for the most part insist that all types of armament, land, sea and air, should be dealt with simultaneously. Other Powers, including the United States, have maintained that further naval limitation might well be given immediate consideration, even though the time may not yet have arrived for the holding of a successful conference of a more general character.
Without attempting to analyze the arguments pro and con on this point, we will, as a matter of orderly presentation, consider separately naval limitation and the limitation of other military elements.
I. NAVAL LIMITATION
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