EDWARD H. HUME, former President of Yale-in-China
WE shall have, some day, a history of China that pictures vividly the unique succession of the seasonal cycles in her national life: long winters of stagnation of thought and activity, following on days of real harvest; and followed, in turn, by the freshness of spring, when the sap of vitality crowds the blossoms out on every branch before the frost has disappeared. It is spring, though winds of violence scatter petal and seed pod, delaying, even destroying, much of the fruitage. Of no period will the historian say with such assurance as of today, "This was spring. Here China was young again."
To those who have felt the violence of the extremists and watched the withdrawal of the moderates, Young China means hot-headedness and irresponsibility. The term recalls to their minds noisy groups of youngsters, herded into line for a patriotic procession, ordered to shout slogans, compelled to carry banners with truly strange devices, keen to overthrow all order and discipline in school as well as government, "for patriotic reasons." Such radicalism, however, is only part of the picture. It is generally admitted that not over twenty percent of the student world supports the extremist program. It would be as unfair to limit the term Young China to the violent radicals as to designate only the vociferous and the immature when speaking of Young America or Young France.
The truer Young China is the group that is moved by the vitality of spring, crowding out the old stagnancy. It includes the thoughtless, to be sure; but it also includes even larger numbers of those thoughtful souls who understand something of what it means to build up a vigorous, self-dependent nation. It is the purpose of this study to inquire in some detail what Young China stands for, what are the forces that impel it and the pitfalls on its road, what its program is and what it holds of future promise...
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