An American Substitute for British Blockades
CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University; formerly Solicitor for the Department of State
IF Great Britain, acting on behalf of the League of Nations, should blockade the territory of a state that had gone to war in contempt of its peace pledge as a member of the League, what would the United States do? Sometimes the question is put thus: Is it conceivable that the American and British navies might some day clash because the United States stood for its full rights as a neutral? These queries, which are not infrequently heard, point to a major problem of American diplomacy.
Great Britain, like other members of the League, has accepted some heavy burdens. Among them is the duty, under certain circumstances, to prevent all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of a League member which resorts to war in disregard of the Covenant, "and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not." The matter of sanctions is broadly dealt with in Article 16 of the Covenant. At Locarno in October 1925, Messrs. Beneš, Briand, Chamberlain, Mussolini, Skrzynski and Vandervelde, informed Germany that Article 16 "must be understood to mean that each state member of the League is bound to coöperate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any act of aggression to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account." Now the British Government doubtless would assert the right to judge for itself whether in a given case a British blockade against a covenant-breaking belligerent were essential or desirable; they might be slow to admit that any duty to the League demanded recourse to that particular measure. Nevertheless, it must be assumed that a British Government might sometime regard it as a British duty or privilege, and this possibility causes much perplexity on both sides of the Atlantic. Here is the reason...
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THE recent Anglo-French negotiations have again focused attention on the problem of the limitation of naval armaments. Nothing is so calculated to whet the appetite of the public as an international agreement of which the existence is known and the text withheld. Now that the text of this agreement has been published the element in it which is surprising is its futility. It is hard to see by what chain of reasoning its authors persuaded themselves that it would afford a basis for a general naval understanding.
ANY attempt to specify authoritatively the most important military decisions of the Second World War would require too much by way of preliminary definition to be possible in reasonably short compass. Yet to join together, however sketchily, some of the events which to one individual marked the general pattern of the war may induce other more serious efforts and possibly provoke a reappraisal of some events heretofore overlooked or taken for granted.
THE statements recently made by President Hoover and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald prove that the malaise which has underlain Anglo-American relations since the break-down of the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927 has been dispelled. The suspicion which was then engendered has been replaced by the confidence that, whatever the practical difficulties may be, the two countries are agreed that their navies shall be equal and therefore non-competitive and that they genuinely desire to make the Paris Pact for the renunciation of war the basis of their international policy.

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