Can Aircraft Be Limited?

IN THE disarmament equation aviation is still a factor x. It is still preëminent among the difficulties, and so among the obstructions to success on a comprehensive front. In 1932, as on every other occasion since the World War when the matter of arms limitation has received concerted attention, the technical problems of the air arm are the most baffling that have to be solved. In air forces there are no universal units of measurement. There is no sharp distinction between one type of aircraft and another such as can be drawn, for example, between battleships and cruisers. There is no generally acceptable yardstick, corresponding to tonnage in naval vessels, for the simple expression of relative collective strength. There is not even any sharp line of demarcation between military and non-military craft.

Limitation, difficult enough at best for technical reasons, is made harder by the mystery which envelops the possible uses and effectiveness of aircraft in war. Opinion is by no means agreed on these points. Some military men and a vast number of civilians have come to take it for granted that the next war will be fought almost exclusively in the air, and that it will be ended within a few hours or a few days by the destruction of all the great populous centers in the territory of the less well-prepared of the combatants. Opposed to this opinion is that of most students of military and naval affairs, who take such forecasts with many grains of salt. Those responsible for national defense are not persuaded that aircraft make other arms obsolete. Uncertainty is inherent in the nature of the air arm and in the conditions under which aircraft are constructed. An air force, unlike a navy or a powerful army, can conceivably be built under cover; and in the hands of a treacherous neighbor it can strike in the dark.

Confronted by technical difficulties, by divided opinions, by lively fears, it is not surprising that responsible government officials, or at least most of them, are inclined to rely on air forces of their own rather than on pledges as a safeguard against the aërial threat. Hence, statesmen and soldiers alike are highly suspicious of any attempt to restrict their nation's development of air power...

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