Necessary Changes in Our Commercial Policy
F. W. TAUSSIG, Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University; Chairman of the United States Tariff Commission, 1917-19; author of "Tariff History of the United States," and other standard works
THE policy of the United States regarding reciprocal trade arrangements with other countries has gone through several phases; and it now seems likely to enter another. The direct and immediate effect of a realignment is easily exaggerated. Moreover, it seems a dry subject, involving details about processes of negotiation. And yet, in its underlying essentials it has a very great importance. The spirit and temper in which it is approached make an enormous difference in our relations with other countries, in our own gains or losses when trading with them, in our influence on the whole course of world development. In what follows I shall deal with the arid details only so far as some knowledge of them is necessary in order to understand this particular situation. My main purpose will be to direct attention to the larger lessons.
Our present policy regarding reciprocal trade arrangements dates in part from 1909, in part from the first half of the decade 1920-30. It rests to some extent on diplomatic action, mainly on legislation. The legislative provisions go back to the tariff act of 1909, when the previous reciprocity provisions of 1897 were abolished, and it was enacted that the United States would deal with foreign countries simply and solely on the penalty basis -- the threat basis, or, if you please, the holding up of a club. The duties then imposed (with the extraordinary detail that appears in all our tariff acts) were expressly stated to constitute the minimum tariff of the United States. The maximum was, on each several rate, 25 percent in addition. This maximum tariff the President was authorized to apply to imports from a country which in any way "unduly discriminated" against the United States. The minimum tariff -- that is, the real tariff -- was under no circumstances to be lowered. That is, the United States offered nothing in the way of concession; we simply threatened the foreign countries if they "unduly discriminated."
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
Although few U.S. politicians will admit it, antidumping policy has strayed far from its original purpose of guarding against predatory foreign firms. It is now little more than an excuse for a few powerful industries to shield themselves from competition -- at great cost to both American consumers and American business.
The American labor movement has basically concentrated on domestic issues--with the notable exception of its vigorous efforts to further the cause of human rights, free trade unionism and political democracy throughout the world. This focus on the United States has been the result of both the sheer size of the American economy and work force and the specific circumstances which gave rise to the rapid growth of the labor movement in the 1930s.
Unless there is new legislation, the President will, at midnight on June 30, 1967, lose his power to cut American tariffs in trade bargains with other countries. The situation is familiar enough. Eleven times already the country has faced the question of renewing the grant of power first made in the Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Each time, Congress has prolonged the power, sometimes enlarging and sometimes reducing it. Mixing long-run policy and short-run tactics to get the best possible terms for the renewal of trade legislation is an old art in Washington. But this renewal is different.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.