WALTER LIPPMANN, special writer for the New York Herald-Tribune and other newspapers; author of "A Preface to Morals," "The United States in World Affairs," and other works
THE contributions of Sir Austen Chamberlain and of Mr. John W. Davis to "The Foreign Policy of the Powers"[i] present a curious contrast. The underlying assumptions and the general implications of Sir Austen's paper are that British policy is governed by clearly defined principles which promote the immediate security of the Empire and the general peace of the world. Mr. Davis, on the other hand, takes the view that America's policy because of a failure to "join the concert of nations" is no longer "adequate to preserve her peace and insure her prosperity." I should like to raise the question whether this very assumption, that the British policy is adequate and the American inadequate, is not today a serious obstacle to a meeting of minds and to the practice of coöperation by the English-speaking peoples. I believe it is. I believe that the accepted idea that America is "isolationist" and that Great Britain is a member in good standing of a concert of the Powers is an illusion which masks and then distorts the relations between Britain and America.
I
The ideal of Anglo-American coöperation to preserve the peace of the world is supported by certain general considerations. As between Britain and America there are no disputed frontiers. There are no disputed spheres of influence in Asia, Africa, or the Americas. There is commercial rivalry in certain parts of the world but it does not have and does not threaten to have any serious political consequences. For neither government thinks that it could or should advance its commercial interests by political expansion and both are well aware that political stability and equal opportunity in Asia, South America and continental Europe would be more profitable than a régime of special privileges...
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THE American tariff bargaining program appears to be in a critical stage. In the two years following its inauguration in June 1934 it scored substantial accomplishments. American negotiators were successful in getting rid of some of the most serious hindrances to the expansion of American trade in foreign markets. Discriminations of long standing in French and Canadian tariffs were replaced by most-favored-nation treatment.
LAST April the American and British Treasuries published two plans for monetary stabilization after the war, one the work of Harry D. White, Director of the Division of Monetary Research of the Treasury Department, the other of Lord Keynes, now serving as an adviser of the British Treasury. Since I commented on the two plans in these pages last summer [i] several events have occurred which might indicate that the present is not a good moment to continue the discussion. In July there appeared a Canadian plan which was in the nature of a compromise between the other two.
I HAVE been invited to write about the reasons for misunderstandings between the British and American peoples. This is rather a delicate subject, for any criticism of the United States may be taken out of its context and used by those who do not desire friendship between the two peoples to suggest that I am personally unfriendly to the United States. This would be entirely untrue.

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