France and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty
ANDRÉ GÉRAUD, known under the nom-de-plume of "Pertinax" as chief political writer of the Echo de Paris
SIR SAMUEL HOARE, British Foreign Minister, and Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, special German Ambassador, exchanged a series of letters on June 18 which constituted a broad Anglo-German naval agreement. All Europe was dum-founded by the suddenness of the event.
The origins of the agreement are to be found in the conversations which Sir John Simon and Chancellor Hitler had at Berlin on March 25 and 26. Hitler, disregarding the objections of the Wilhelmstrasse, proposed to his visitor that Germany should recognize by a bilateral agreement the naval hegemony of Great Britain, while herself remaining satisfied with a naval power equal to that of France (such was the expression used), or one-third that of Britain. It was immediately pointed out to der Führer that this proposal lacked consistency. The French fleet was half as big as the British; consequently the German navy could hardly equal that of France and still be one-third that of Great Britain. As a result, Hitler in his famous speech of May 21 expressed his claims in more exact terms: the German navy was to be 35 percent of the English or 15 percent smaller than the French. "The German Government," added Hitler, "voluntarily recognize the supreme vital importance, and thus the justification, for a dominating protection of the British world Empire at sea, just as we ourselves, on the other hand, are determined to do everything necessary for the protection of our existence and freedom on the continent. The German Government sincerely intend to do everything to bring about and maintain such relations with the British people and state as will for ever prevent a repetition of the only war which there has as yet been between the two nations."
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FUTURE historians, distributing praise and blame for the Munich "settlement," will of course take into account the long chain of things done which ought not to have been done, and of things left undone which ought to have been done, that winds itself through all the last twenty years of European history.
ON May 10 Hitler sent his troops into Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. He chose the moment well. For although there had been repeated alarms of just such a German invasion, the British and French Governments were neither of them in a condition to react to the actual event instantly and in unison. In both countries there was a cabinet crisis.
ISVOLSKY AND THE WORLD WAR. BY FREIDRICH STIEVE. New York: Knopf, 1926.
AU SERVICE DE LA FRANCE. BY RAYMOND POINCARÉ. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1926. Vols. I--III.
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, 1892-1916. BY VISCOUNT GREY of Fallodon, K.G. New York: Stokes, 1925. 2 vols.
THE INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY, 1904-1914. BY G. LOWES DICKINSON. New York: Century Co., 1926.
THE SERAJEVO CRIME. BY M. EDITH DURHAM. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1925.
SARAJEVO. BY R. W. SETON-WATSON. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1926.

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