EDGAR SNOW, for seven years an American journalist in China; now Peiping correspondent of the London Daily Herald; author of "Far Eastern Front"
AMONG the numerous threads feeding day by day into the uneven fabric of Sino-Japanese history one glowing strand is never lost. It is described somewhat tritely by rulers of both countries as The Red Menace. It is so clearly of importance in the present Sino-Japanese crisis that it needs to be closely examined. About the pivotal idea of fan-kung, or "counter-communism," may turn the fate of all China.
Although the Japanese desire to "coöperate" with Nanking has often found expression in demands for a Sino-Japanese understanding against communist intrusions, the project of an anti-Red alliance was not given recognition as an organic part of Japan's China policy until last autumn. It was done then with the formulation of the Three Points of Mr. Hirota, at that time Japanese Foreign Minister, today Premier of his country.
The Hirota program defined Japan's requirements in China in the following order: (1) the abandonment by China of "her policy of playing one foreign country against another," and positive demonstrations by Nanking, affecting all phases of Chinese life, of a sincere desire to coöperate with Japan; (2) "recognition by Nanking of the existence of Manchukuo," and the realization of a Japan-China-Manchukuo economic bloc; (3) "formation of a common front against the Chinese communists and the further extension of Red Influence in China."
In the tradition of Oriental diplomacy, the last item is the most heavily freighted with meaning. The other two are complementary. Neither of them can be realized with any degree of permanence or security without the third. The Red power in China, with all its internal potentialities, and with the prospect it offers of a close union between Soviet China and the U. S. S. R., now constitutes a major obstacle in the path of Japanese imperialism...
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THE incident which occurred in Manchuria during the night of September 18 set in motion a train of events of great magnitude. The incident itself was unimportant: a gunmen's fight in New York or a riot of unemployed in London would produce as many casualties. Yet the encounter between a handful of Chinese and Japanese troops at Mukden has caused the world to reëxamine the whole peace machinery which has been set up since the World War, and in the light of that study to question whether it is advisable or possible to move rapidly toward a reduction of armaments.
BARON MAKOTO SAITO, Governor-General of Korea, stated the fundamental principles of the colonial policy of the Japanese Empire in three terse sentences: "The economic development of the country must come first. Education and the raising of the standards of the people will follow. Afterwards political development may be possible." He was discussing the problems of Korea, but his words describe perfectly the course which his country is following in every colony over which floats the banner of the Rising Sun.
IN presenting an unbiased picture of Japan's attitude towards China certain general conclusions may be set forth at the beginning. First, Japan has definitely renounced aggressive or imperialistic designs such as were apparent in her attitude between, say, 1915 and 1919.

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