BRUCE HOPPER, Assistant Professor of Government in Harvard University; author of "Pan-Sovietism" and other works.
THE Kamchatka fisheries question is the hardy perennial of discord between Soviet Russia and Japan. From small beginnings it has now assumed the proportions of a major political issue. Its ramifications can best be presented by noting the stages of its growth.
Pre-revolution Period. The Tsarist Government exhibited an extraordinary disinterest in the riches of Russia's Far Eastern waters and permitted Japan to obtain a long headstart in their exploitation. The first privileges which Japan received from Russia were contained in that same Treaty of 1875 whereby Russia acquired Sakhalin and Japan the Kurile Islands. The treaty gave Japanese fishing boats and traders rights equal to those granted by Russia under the most-favored-nation clause. Subsequently, Japanese fish buyers conducted a brisk trade with the natives at the mouth of the Amur. But the special fishing rights exercised by Japan spring from Article 11 of the Treaty of Portsmouth as implemented by the Fishery Convention of 1907, which granted Japanese subjects the "right to capture, gather and manufacture marine products along the Russian coasts facing the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea." According to this convention, concessions (or fishing lots for lease) were to be distributed by auction with no discrimination as between Japanese and Russian nationals...
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Russia's post-Soviet orientation is in serious trouble. The West does not want to see any structure in Eurasia that permits Russian hegemony, but abetting continued chaos in the former Soviet space is hardly in the West's interest. Central Asia and the Caucasus are rife with flash points that could ignite and draw in outside powers, and the presence of nuclear weapons raises the stakes even higher. The United States should support integration, not division. For its part, Russia should work with nearby countries to help unite diverse peoples in a stabler system.
THE inevitability and the imminence of an armed conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union are both of them matters open to doubt; and this writer is among the most skeptical. But if such a war comes, its initial course can be predicted with considerable confidence. Three underlying factors would in particular condition its character.
The next logical step in the Asian quadrille is Japanese-Soviet rapprochement. To state the obvious, by its détente with China in 1971 the United States finally recognized the Sino-Soviet rift and ended the bipolar cold war. Partly in response, the Soviet Union restrained its own rivalry with the United States by signing in May 1972 a treaty limiting missile buildups. China then preempted any possible Soviet-Japanese entente by ending her hostility toward Japan and in September opening diplomatic relations with Tokyo for the first time in a generation.

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