Home › Features › Essays › What France Means to England

What France Means to England

By Harold Nicolson
January 1939
Print Email
Login or Register to leave a comment.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.

POLITICAL alliances are not, as Herr Hitler rightly remarked, concluded upon a basis of compatibility of temper; they are concluded for the purpose of assuring certain common ends. The history of Anglo-French relations during the last thirty-five years is a proof of that aphorism. Our national characters, and at moments our immediate national aims, have proved incompatible; it is because we have throughout been faced by a basic common danger that we have been obliged, in spite of many quarrels, to retain our connection.

The American people have a congenital sympathy for France. To the great mass of Americans, France signifies a fellow Republic inspired by a common faith in the rights of man. Gratitude to Lafayette is even today a constantly renewed inspiration and the American schoolboy learns to look upon France as a hereditary friend. Contacts between the two countries are sentimental rather than actual, and those richer Americans who visit France are charmed by the luxuries and elegances of her ancient civilization. True, the war and its aftermath have done much to diminish this sentimental legend; yet the feeling is there; it is vague but widespread; it might at any moment again become operative.

The British people do not share these sympathies. It is not only that our history books indicate that France has for centuries been hostile towards us, it is that the two national characters are diametrically opposed. The average Englishman (and most Englishmen are extremely true to type) is slow, unintellectual and puritan. He regards Frenchmen as vivacious, and therefore volatile; as nimble-witted, and therefore unreliable; as hedonistic, and therefore profligate. He mistrusts their politicians, whom he regards as treacherous and corrupt. He is irritated by their press polemics, which he attributes, and not without reason, to foreign subventions. And he dislikes their foreign policy, which jars on his isolationist feelings and makes him dread lest we be dragged into trouble "at the coat-tails of France."

This is a premium article

You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.

Buy PDF

Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.

Related

Essay, Jan 1966
"Chunnel"
Frank P. Davidson

Almost unnoticed during the postwar crises in European relationships, the English Channel Tunnel-that "hardy perennial"-has inched its way forward until now, with a consensus of political and expert opinion behind it, the project appears to be on the threshold of realization. The official decision to proceed with "Chunnel," as it is nicknamed, was announced last year in an exchange of messages between Queen Elizabeth II and General de Gaulle. There followed a final technical survey, conducted for the two governments by the Channel Tunnel Study Group. The data resulting from its extensive geological and geophysical investigations enabled the route to be determined and precise engineering plans to be drawn up. Certain administrative and financial matters remain to be dealt with before actual construction can begin, but it seems certain that within six or seven years passengers will be finding the rail journey between London and Paris no more remarkable than, for instance, a trip from New York to Boston or from Paris to Brussels.

Read
Essay, Fall 1988
Munich After 50 Years
Gerhard L. Weinberg

Offers a revisionist account of Munich, noting that Hitler regarded it as 'the greatest setback to his career'. Concludes that "those commitments, policies and alliances that can reasonably be expected to involve a country in a great war must be clearly articulated, understood at least in general by the public and perceived as truly essential to the nation's security".

Read
Essay, Jul 1963
After Brussels
Andrew Shonfield

In 1962 the European enthusiasts in Brussels were explaining regretfully that although British membership would slow down the process of European integration-perhaps severely impede the whole movement toward a United States of Europe-it was a price that had to be paid for widening the geographical spread of the Community. No doubt these people, while regretting the manner of General de Gaulle's rupture of negotiations with Britain, are now privately relieved that the price will not have to be paid. Their view is that Britain's inherent weakness is such that she will be compelled sooner or later to come back and knock on the door again and plead for entry into the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). On the whole, better later than sooner. The European Community will by then have consolidated itself; it will be able to impose its terms with less difficulty and, in fairness it should be added, will be less niggling about making small concessions which may contravene the letter, though not the spirit, of the Treaty of Rome.

Read