BRITAIN'S Colonies, no less than the Dominions and India, are contributing their share to the war effort of the Commonwealth. The spectacular activities of the Canadian airmen over Britain, of the Australians and New Zealanders in Libya, of the Indian division in Eritrea and of the South African troops in Ethiopia should not lead us to overlook the important rôle being played by the Empire's "junior partners" -- the crown colonies, the protectorates and the mandated territories.
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Before describing the part played by the British Colonies in the war, however, I should like to explain briefly just what they are. I found during a recent tour of the United States that there was considerable vagueness about the Colonial Empire even in otherwise well-informed quarters -- which is perhaps not surprising, seeing that it is none too well known at home.
The British Colonial Empire comprises some forty separate territories, large and small, at greatly varying stages of political, social and economic development, scattered across the globe, covering a land area of three million square miles (exclusive of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) and containing a population -- white, black, brown and yellow -- of some sixty-five million people. The whites are in a small minority, for most of the colonies are tropical or sub-tropical and are therefore, unlike the Dominions, largely unsuited for white settlement.
Let us for a moment make a bird's-eye survey of this variegated Empire. Turning first to the Western Hemisphere we find numerous colonies off the coast of North America or clustered in the Caribbean -- Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica and the other British West Indies, British Honduras and British Guiana -- much in the news of late as a result of Britain's having granted the United States sites for naval and air bases on some of them. Further down in the South Atlantic lie Ascension, St. Helena, the Falklands -- all useful points d'appui in Britain's control of the sea -- as well as Tristan da Cunha, "loneliest isle," and a section of Antarctica...
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THE recent Anglo-French negotiations have again focused attention on the problem of the limitation of naval armaments. Nothing is so calculated to whet the appetite of the public as an international agreement of which the existence is known and the text withheld. Now that the text of this agreement has been published the element in it which is surprising is its futility. It is hard to see by what chain of reasoning its authors persuaded themselves that it would afford a basis for a general naval understanding.
SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S COMMAND, 1915-1918. BY G. A. B. DEWAR, assisted by LT.-COL. J. H. BORASTON. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1922.
THE POMP OF POWER. ANONYMOUS. New York: Doran, 1922.
INTRIGUES OF THE WAR. BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MAURICE. London: WESTMINSTER GAZETTE, reprint, 1922.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND. BY GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS. New York: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, December, 1922.
HAIG AND FOCH. BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR GEORGE ASTON. London: THE QUARTERLY REVIEW, April, 1923.
IF Great Britain, acting on behalf of the League of Nations, should blockade the territory of a state that had gone to war in contempt of its peace pledge as a member of the League, what would the United States do? Sometimes the question is put thus: Is it conceivable that the American and British navies might some day clash because the United States stood for its full rights as a neutral? These queries, which are not infrequently heard, point to a major problem of American diplomacy.

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