HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG, editor of FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OUR aim in this war is the complete material and psychological defeat of our enemies. We have rejected the idea of an armistice or negotiated peace and have pledged ourselves not to accept either at any stage or in any guise. When we have beaten Germany, Japan, Italy and their satellites, together or seriatim, into unconditional surrender, and while we are making sure that our accomplishment cannot be evaded or undone, we shall not recognize any limitations on our action except those imposed by our own consciences or any commitments except those which have been arrived at openly among the United Nations.
The outlines of the postwar world which we and our allies have already sketched constitute a pledge to and among ourselves alone. We may bungle the attempt to turn it into living reality. If so, we shall again suffer the lamentable consequences of our failure. But this time we are making our enemies no promises and shall not count on them to fulfill any part of a bargain. We on our side rely on ourselves alone -- our own physical strength, our own strength of will. If we fail to keep the promises which we have made to ourselves and between ourselves we shall complete the destruction of our civilization by our own sole negligence and frivolity.
We hope to be able eventually to accept the peoples now our enemies as partners, and we are prepared to go as fast and as far as we safely can in making such a relationship with us seem reasonable and even attractive. But we fear that "eventually" is a long way off. In the interim, the one standard by which we shall measure every step will be whether it increases or diminishes our security. We shall try this time to remember how close we came to destruction and the grim sacrifices by which at the last moment we saved ourselves from it. Without vindictiveness but without apology or compunction we shall assign each of our beaten enemies his necessary rôle; and, provided we can match our perseverance to our present determination, we shall see that he carries that rôle through precisely, until such time as we may deliberately decide to modify it.
What does this mean, country by country?
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"Our enemies did not use their victory of 1918."--Dr. Robert Ley, Leader of the Nazi Labor Front, November 27, 1940.
WHY did the United States go to war in 1917? For an answer, some point to the banks and munitions makers, some to the character of President Wilson, some to the capitalist system, some to Allied propagandists. In any attempt at presenting a complete answer, careful consideration must be given to what was in the minds of the American people themselves in the thirty-two months during which the United States was neutral. There were speakers, books, periodicals, and movies which gave the American people interpretations of the war and provoked popular emotions and reactions.
THE recent Anglo-French negotiations have again focused attention on the problem of the limitation of naval armaments. Nothing is so calculated to whet the appetite of the public as an international agreement of which the existence is known and the text withheld. Now that the text of this agreement has been published the element in it which is surprising is its futility. It is hard to see by what chain of reasoning its authors persuaded themselves that it would afford a basis for a general naval understanding.

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