HANSON W. BALDWIN, military and naval correspondent of the New York Times; author of "The Caissons Roll," "Strategy for Victory" and other works
THE three-power Conference in the Crimea, the Russian sweep from the Vistula across the Oder, and the American return to Luzon and invasion of Iwo in the Volcano Islands, 750 miles from Tokyo, were the principal milestones of the sixth winter of the war -- the fourth of American participation.
Military coöperation among the Allies reached a new high at Yalta. The Conference put an end to the German hopes of dividing the Allies and perfected plans for the last stages of the war in Europe. Another topic of discussion, though one not publicized, was the question of Russian participation in the Pacific war. Some agreements, though incomplete, were reached on the political problems of Europe; but where the Russians agreed to concessions, for example in the cases of Poland and Jugoslavia, it remained a question how far the excellent statements of principle would produce results acceptable in the long run either to foreign opinion or to the majority of the populations directly concerned.
II
In the broad strategic picture, the great Russian winter offensive which commenced on January 12 and quickly spread from the Baltic to the Carpathians compensated for the sharp reverse suffered by the American Armies in the Ardennes at the end of 1944. An attempt has been made by the War Department and by SHAEF to paint the Ardennes reverse as a great American victory. To this writer the attempt seems unnecessary and stupid. The flexibility and efficiency of the American staff work under stress of an unexpected blow, and the indomitable courage and combat efficiency shown by many American divisions, combined to prevent the Germans from succeeding in their maximum objective. The achievement does not call for hyperbole. Yet exaggerated accounts of the battle in the Ardennes have been issued, based apparently on the mistaken idea of too many of our military spokesmen -- that in handling public relations it is best to hide errors and inefficiencies and to make reverses appear as victories in order to "protect" our leaders from the consequences of public reaction to mistakes...
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THE spring of 1944 has been a time of preparation. Now the preparations are to be put to the test. The invasion of western Europe, an operation of such size and peculiar complexity that there is probably no analogy to it in military history, is imminent as these lines are written. By the time they are published, the Allies may be engaged in the furious battles which will decide at the minimum the duration of the war, at the maximum its outcome.
IN the summer of 1944 the American Army came of age. The successful invasion of Normandy and the quick capture of Cherbourg in June meant the negation, in a strategic sense, of all Hitler's hopes and marked the beginning of the end for Germany. In rapid succession, in late July and August, the forces of the Allies broke out from the Cotentin peninsula, smashed much of the German Seventh Army, overran Brittany, captured Paris and reached the Meuse at Sedan. Simultaneously, they invaded southern France.
AMERICA'S third year of war closed with United States troops fighting in the Philippine Islands and along the borders of Germany. The fourth year opens with the end of the war in sight.

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