ALLEN W. DULLES, American member of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference in 1926, and legal adviser to the American delegation at the Three Power Naval Conference in 1927 and at the Disarmament Conference in 1932 and 1933; representative of OSS in Central Europe, 1942-1945, and Chief of the OSS Mission to Germany after V-E Day
THE Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations finds today that it has caught up with and must face in all their complex difficulty the two central problems of the ageold disarmament question: How can the world limit production of weapons of destruction? How can it insure effective control of that limitation? As these weapons become increasingly more devastating, the challenge to man's ingenuity and vision becomes correspondingly more impelling. But in essence the issues are the same as those debated for years at Geneva between the two world wars.
For over ten years, from the early 1920's until 1934, the League of Nations wrestled with the problem of limiting armaments. The failure to get results at that time has rather obscured the fact that some useful work in this field was done at Geneva, and that this work bears on many of the problems now faced by the Atomic Energy Commission.
At Geneva it was necessary to decide what weapons to limit or ban; what should be the nature of the limitations; how to make certain that the limitations would be carried out; and, finally, how to impose effective sanctions if they were not carried out. Today we do not need to discuss what we want to ban in the field of atomic weapons. The great issues now turn on the methods to be adopted with regard to supervision and sanctions.
Paradoxically enough, the League Disarmament Conference failed just because it was approaching the point of achievement, not because of its futility. This paradox is explainable by the attitude of Germany. Hitler could not afford to let the Conference succeed. It would block his plans for rearmament. He was safe in playing along while the conferees at Geneva dawdled and debated. But when, late in 1933, real progress was made on a concrete program, Hitler broke up the Conference. The agreement which was being drafted was to be a treaty with teeth; there was a definite program to limit and reduce armaments, and it was to be subject to control on the spot. It would have been next to impossible for Hitler to have signed such a treaty and agreed to the measures of supervision, and at the same time to have carried out a program of secret rearmament...
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
Graham Allison was among the first scholars to sound the alarm about the risks of Russian loose nukes, and in "How to Stop Nuclear Terrorism" (January/February 2004), he continues to warn of this underappreciated danger. He is right to highlight the inadequacy of current U.S. and international efforts to deny terrorists access to fissile material. And he makes a compelling case for the need to develop a more coherent and multilateral strategy for stopping them.
Two years ago, Washington accused Pyongyang of running a secret nuclear weapons program. But how much evidence was there to back up the charge? A review of the facts shows that the Bush administration misrepresented and distorted the data--while ignoring the one real threat North Korea actually poses.
Renewed anxiety over a nuclear attack has prompted three new books on the threat and how to confront it. On one key point they all agree: the need to ensure that "peaceful" nuclear programs do not serve as a guise for less-than-peaceful intentions.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.