CHARLES RIST, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Paris; chief French financial adviser at the World Economic Conference; Economic Adviser to the Ministry of Blockade, 1939-40; author of many works
AT THE moment when hostilities ended and France was completely liberated, the new French Government headed by General de Gaulle faced a singularly grave financial situation. This can be pictured by a few statistics. The daily indemnity paid to the Germans during the occupation, first amounting to 300 million and finally to 500 million francs, had increased the bank note circulation from 142 to 572 billions. The level of official prices, taking 1938 as the basis for comparison, had risen from 102 to 276; but the real level, reflected by black-market prices, had approximately quadrupled. Expenditures in the 1945 budget reached 512 billions (not including 88 billions outside the budget), while receipts amounted to 207 billions -- whence could be foreseen a deficit of about 300 billions.
These figures evoked a double problem, at once monetary and financial. Was it feasible then and there to fix on an acceptable rate of exchange for the franc with the pound and the dollar, from which it had been cut off for five years? Secondly, could budgetary expenditures and receipts be balanced while the foundations of the French economy were shattered? -- while the railways, bridges and roads remained partly destroyed and the system of electrical production and distribution was in chaos; when coal output was reduced by half; when automobile production and repair had not functioned for five years; when there was a dearth of gasoline; and when foreign trade was practically suspended, which meant that the only way to pay for imports was to draw on the reserves of the Bank of France?
Budgetary problems, monetary problems and problems of reconstruction thus loomed up at the same time and inextricably intermingled. It is hardly surprising that at the outset proposed solutions were hesitant and uncertain. However, one fact seemed obvious and dominated all the others: the systematic inflation organized by the Germans had to be stopped as soon as possible. The military and administrative expenses of the state must be reduced and efforts concentrated on reconstruction. Thrift must be encouraged and bounds set to the rise of prices...
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
THE French financial situation is a cause of deep anxiety not only to Frenchmen but to their neighbors and friends. What, exactly, are the difficulties in which France finds herself? What are their origins? What are the solutions?
Anti-Americanism and a stubborn Gaullist independence in foreign policy have often marked French political discourse. These traits are coming to the fore once again in France's wildly popular antiglobalization movement. Today, a complex mix of political, economic, and cultural reasons explains the French resistance to "Anglo-Saxon global capitalism." If sustained, France's stand could become a model for other countries seeking an alternative to the new, American-style world economy.
Though initially hailed for his "bulldozer" Balkan leadership, Chirac's nuclear testing and fiscal austerity have alienated the public and cut his honeymoon short.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.