Dismemberment of Germany the Allied Negotiations from Yalta to Potsdam
PHILIP E. MOSELY, Professor of International Relations at the Russian Institute of Columbia University; officer of the Department of State, 1942-46; Political Adviser, U. S. Delegation to the European Advisory Commission, 1944-45; author of works on Slavic questions
DURING World War II, the idea of punishing Germany for obeying Hitler to the end and supporting the Nazi bid for world domination found strong backing. Many influential Allied leaders felt that the most telling reprisal could be inflicted on her by decreeing her dismemberment. This feeling reached its high point at the Yalta Conference. There a provision for dismemberment was added to the surrender instrument previously prepared for German signature, and a secret committee was established to study and report on the steps necessary for carrying the plan into execution. Three weeks after V-E Day, however, Marshal Stalin complained to the late Harry Hopkins that Foreign Secretary Eden and the American Ambassador to Britain, the late John G. Winant, had rejected dismemberment.[i] In the absence of other evidence it might be assumed that Stalin's complaint gave a full account of the fate of the Yalta decision on German dismemberment. Actually, this is not the case. As we shall see, it was Stalin's own decision which put an end to effective discussion of this issue; and on May 8, 1945, he publicly renounced dismemberment as a Soviet aim. In the meantime, however, the action at Yalta looking toward dismemberment had gravely compromised the arrangements which had been agreed upon for recording Germany's unconditional surrender.
The idea of keeping Germany divided into several or many independent and rival states has had a long history. It was a prominent objective of French policy, from Richelieu to Napoleon III and Clemenceau. The hope and desire for the partition of Germany haunted Allied policy-makers during the Second World War, and played an important part in delaying and confusing the efforts to achieve, before Germany's surrender, a consistent and effective Allied policy for the postwar treatment of defeated Germany. One of the main difficulties was that the proponents of dismemberment never made clear exactly what it really implied. Was Germany to be divided into several completely independent states? Was partition to be welcomed and encouraged if it emerged spontaneously after defeat? Or was it to be imposed and maintained by force? Did dismemberment mean the destruction of Prussian preponderance within the Reich and the strengthening of the historic smaller states within a loose confederation? These questions remained unanswered throughout the Allied discussions...
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THE first steps towards three-Power planning for the occupation and control of Germany after her eventual defeat were taken at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943. In those days the Red Army was continuing its powerful advance against the German armies (Kiev was liberated during the Conference), and the forces of the Western Allies were preparing their tremendous attack upon Hitler's "Fortress Europe." The need for coördinating the political planning of the major Allies thus became more and more obvious and acute. During Mr.
ALLIED policy in Germany still is formally governed by the Potsdam agreement, though every day that passes increases the doubt whether this agreement can and will be implemented. Why is this the case, and what can we do about it? The danger of a breakdown of Four Power collaboration in Germany is so alarming that our examination of the alternatives still open to the United States should be stated in the most factual terms.
The principal economic provisions of the Potsdam agreement were as follows:
THE Atlantic Pact Governments are recommending that the West German Federal Republic be admitted to the Western supra-national community and that West German troops be integrated with the mutual defense organization which they wish to bring into being as rapidly as possible. At the same time Western public opinion, particularly in Western Europe, has frequently voiced doubts as to the expediency of this policy.

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