PHILIP E. MOSELY, Professor of International Relations at the Russian Institute of Columbia University; officer of the Department of State, 1942-46; Political Adviser, U. S. Delegation to the European Advisory Commission, 1944-45; author of works on Slavic questions
THE first steps towards three-Power planning for the occupation and control of Germany after her eventual defeat were taken at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943. In those days the Red Army was continuing its powerful advance against the German armies (Kiev was liberated during the Conference), and the forces of the Western Allies were preparing their tremendous attack upon Hitler's "Fortress Europe." The need for coördinating the political planning of the major Allies thus became more and more obvious and acute. During Mr. Eden's visit to Washington the previous March, Harry Hopkins had noted the necessity of reaching an understanding "as to which armies would be where and what kind of administration should be developed."[i] A few days later President Roosevelt instructed Secretary Hull to explore, first with the British and then with the Russians, "the question of what our plan is to be in Germany and Italy during the first months after Germany's collapse."[ii] Even so, the Italian surrender caught the Allies politically unprepared. The cross-purposes and frictions revealed during the negotiations over Italy showed how urgent it was to begin coördinating Allied purposes and arrangements for the surrender of Germany, and to do so well before the event. In September 1943 it was decided to arrange a first meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in preparation for a first conference of the three heads of governments.
At the Moscow Conference, Mr. Hull presented to Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov the American view of postwar policy toward Germany.[iii] Although this memorandum was received favorably, no attempt was made to reach concrete decisions concerning Germany, and the problem was referred to a new body, the European Advisory Commission (henceforth referred to as the EAC), which was to have its seat in London and carry on its work continuously. The memorandum recommended that an inter-Allied control commission be set up to enforce upon Germany the terms of surrender and the policies of the Allies, and that Germany should be occupied by British, Soviet and American forces. Thus the principle of joint responsibility in German policy and of joint occupation of Germany was accepted tacitly in October 1943 as a basis of future planning...
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DURING World War II, the idea of punishing Germany for obeying Hitler to the end and supporting the Nazi bid for world domination found strong backing. Many influential Allied leaders felt that the most telling reprisal could be inflicted on her by decreeing her dismemberment. This feeling reached its high point at the Yalta Conference. There a provision for dismemberment was added to the surrender instrument previously prepared for German signature, and a secret committee was established to study and report on the steps necessary for carrying the plan into execution.
ALLIED policy in Germany still is formally governed by the Potsdam agreement, though every day that passes increases the doubt whether this agreement can and will be implemented. Why is this the case, and what can we do about it? The danger of a breakdown of Four Power collaboration in Germany is so alarming that our examination of the alternatives still open to the United States should be stated in the most factual terms.
The principal economic provisions of the Potsdam agreement were as follows:
THE Atlantic Pact Governments are recommending that the West German Federal Republic be admitted to the Western supra-national community and that West German troops be integrated with the mutual defense organization which they wish to bring into being as rapidly as possible. At the same time Western public opinion, particularly in Western Europe, has frequently voiced doubts as to the expediency of this policy.

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