HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG, Editor of Foreign Affairs.
THREE nations--Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey--cover the right flank of Eisenhower's Europe. They are small, but native pluck, geography and American aid have combined to make them individually strong. If any one of them had been a shade less strong it would be independent no longer but a victim of Stalin's program of national assassination. Together the armies of these three small states number something like three-quarters of a million men, under arms and ready to fight. General Eisenhower must wish that in the present dangerous period he commanded such a force in Western Europe, ready to fight.
As of the present writing, however, this concludes the most satisfactory part of the story. Though they are strong individually, the three nations are weak collectively. Their frontiers adjoin and they are menaced by the same adversary; but they are not linked in any defensive alliance against that adversary and so far as is known they have not developed any joint strategy for dealing with him in case he attacks. If one is invaded, the others do not have a binding commitment to come to its aid; and in case Moscow settles this problem by invading all three at once, none of the three commanders-in-chief knows what moves the other commanders will make.
Furthermore, although geography makes these three states part of Europe's first line of defense facing East, they are not as yet part of the Western military system. They are not members of the Atlantic Pact or of any affiliated regional grouping which would permit the establishment of liaison between their general staffs and the military headquarters of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in Paris. General Eisenhower at present has no jurisdiction over them, no competence to give them advice let alone orders, and not even an excuse to ask them questions...
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IT is the thesis of Count Montgelas that the Great War ended with nobody knowing why he had fought. On that point views will continue to differ so long as history is recorded. It will remain a question of absorbing interest, not only to our generation which fought the war, but also to our children's children. Every thread, therefore, that can be collected and woven into the story is worth preserving, and not alone threads that lead us to understand why the war developed but those also that tell us something of the precise way in which it developed.
THE five Balkan nations which emerged from the greatest of wars--begun, be it noted, by the shot of a Balkan fanatic--were alike in one thing if in nothing else; all required a peaceful interlude for the development of agricultural and manufacturing arts if their citizens were to become sufficiently prosperous and contented to resist the demagogic leaders who were sure to seek in new wars, civil or foreign, the opportunity of furthering their private fortunes. They have enjoyed such an interlude in varying degrees of completeness and for varying periods of time.
EVERYWHERE in the Balkans today is felt the hand, halt hidden, half disclosed, of Rome. Every international event is traced, rightly or wrongly, to the supposed will of Premier Mussolini or his servants. If Rome has been seeking prestige she has won it -- the prestige of fear.

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