JOHN FOSTER DULLES, Special Representative of the President in charge of negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Pacific security treaties; U.S. Senator from New York, 1949-50; member of the U.S. Delegation at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 and at several meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the U.N. General Assembly
THE United States has now signed four major treaties with Pacific nations. One of these is the Treaty of Peace between 48 Allied Powers and Japan. The other three are security treaties, one with the Philippines, another with Australia and New Zealand and the third with Japan.
The Treaty of Peace with Japan has two great purposes. It is first of all designed to close an old war on terms which will not provoke another war. To that end, the victors have made a treaty of reconciliation, eliminating from it all trace of hatred and venge-fulness. They sought, both in the manner of their negotiation and in the substance of their terms, to avoid the humiliations and the discriminations which victors usually impose upon the van-quished either because passion supplants their reason or because they think that is the way to discourage a defeated nation from going to war again. History shows that such a course in fact spurs the vanquished to seek revenge.
The Treaty of Peace with Japan is designed to break the vicious cycle of war, victory, peace and war. Whether it will do so no one can say surely, because no single act of itself is sufficient to guarantee future peace. One can prophesy with confidence, however, that nothing in the peacemaking will cause Japan to turn against the victors, as Germany did after the First World War.
It is something to have made a peace which avoids grievous blunders. There was, however, a second and even more difficult task. That was to translate Japan from a defeated enemy into a positive contributor to collective security in the Pacific as against the new menace of aggression which had arisen even before the old war was formally ended.
II. JAPAN'S COMMITTAL TO THE FREE WORLD
Japan's strategic position and her human and industrial potential are such that there can be no adequate security for anyone in the West Pacific unless the Japanese sincerely desire to be sustaining members of the free world. That, happily, is now the case...
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EVERY country's international thinking is profoundly affected and perhaps finally shaped by its own history, particularly its experience in time of war. The United States itself provides an admirable example. The First World War ultimately engaged American forces on the grand scale; and those forces played a great part in the getting of victory. It was, paradoxically, American leadership which did so much to create what turned out to be a non-American League of Nations. But, the war over, isolationism once more grew and prospered in the United States.
GEOPOLITIK DES PAZIFISCHEN OZEANS. BY KARL HAUSHOFER. Berlin: Vowinckel, 1924.
ONE of the methods which Karl Haushofer uses to hammer his ideas into the minds of his readers is the constant repetition of simple truths. He likes, for instance, to quote a remark by the English geographer and statesman, Sir Thomas Holdich, about "the absolutely immeasurable cost of geographical ignorance." And he never tires of citing Ovid's "fas est ab hoste doceri" (it is right to learn from the enemy), and Disraeli's "at last the best informed one wins."
SUDDENLY and dramatically, the United States on July 26, 1939, gave formal notice for termination of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan. As under the terms of the treaty six months must elapse before this action can take effect, it will terminate on January 25, 1940.

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