Middle Ground Between America and Russia
P, Anonymous
DURING the period of India's struggle for independence, Nationalist opinion looked upon America as a friend and there was widespread sympathy for the Indian cause in America. In the period immediately following India's independence in 1947, these relations continued to be friendly, and by and large Indian leaders looked to America for help and advice in solving the difficult problems which lay ahead of them. But today, no one will deny that the two countries have drifted apart, that large and influential groups in the United States suspect Indian motives and declare her to be pro-Communist. Equally, in India most people are inclined to consider that the United States is deliberately opposing India at every stage and is following an anti-Asian policy with the object of reducing the new countries of Asia to a condition of political dependence.
The United States naturally finds it difficult to understand why, when the great nations of Europe willingly accept American leadership and follow her policy, India, Burma and Indonesia, who achieved their independence so recently and who are weak from a military and economic point of view, should not only hesitate to follow her, but actually oppose her on major issues. It is all the more difficult for America to understand this attitude when she is genuinely anxious to help these countries with money and with technical assistance to overcome their economic weaknesses and if necessary even to strengthen their military resources. No one in these countries has accused America of imperialist designs or of selfish motives. Why, then, ask the Americans, should we, when our approach is so friendly and so unselfish, when all that we desire is only the betterment of the material conditions of these areas and their friendship and support to meet the common menace of Communism, be treated with suspicion and obstructed in our policies designed for the benefit of the entire free world?
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