HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of The New York Times; author of "The Price of Power," "Great Mistakes of the War" and "Power and Politics"
THE Soviet Navy has expanded more rapidly since World War II than any other branch of the Russian armed forces. About 200,000 to 300,000 men have been added to its strength, which now totals between 750,000 and 850,000 officers and men. Its submarine fleet is the largest in the world--in fact the largest in world naval history. The world's newest cruisers-- of the Sverdlovsk class--are Russian. The U.S.S.R. operates 3,000 to 4,000 naval aircraft. The Red Navy's chief, Nikolai Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Fleet, protégé of Stalin, has survived purge and struggle for power to become perhaps the sixth or seventh-ranking military figure in the Soviet Union--which means that Kuznetsov is a political as well as a naval figure. Kuznetsov has called the Baltic, with some reason, Russia's "mare nostrum," and he, Stalin, Malenkov and Bulganin have all stressed the Soviet determination to become a leading sea Power.
Russia is, in fact, well on the way toward that goal. She maintains what Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, has called the second largest fleet in commission.[i] She has a submarine construction capacity estimated at about one a week, and a cruiser construction capability of about 1½ to 2½ ships a year.[ii] She is purchasing merchant ships, fishing vessels and oil tankers (111,918 gross tons as of March 1955) from foreign builders and has a merchant marine that is now the tenth largest in the world (exclusive of satellite shipping).
Yet Russia's sea power has many anomalous features. Russian flagships are rarely seen on the high seas. Her newest cruisers are over-big for the Baltic yet are weakly gunned for blue water. Her Navy has no aircraft carriers, the capital ship of modern fleets. Her naval aircraft are all land-based. She possesses fleets of small craft, which never put to sea, for use on her numerous rivers and lakes. She has relatively few seagoing amphibious craft. The Russian Navy, like the Soviet nation, presents the West with "an enigma wrapped in mystery."
II
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THE Soviet Union is the "Heartland" of the dreams of geopoliticians -- the land from which the "Superpower" will emerge to rule the world. They assumed that the Heartland could subdue and organize Europe, Asia and the whole of Africa by the use of land power, while nations not directly attacked looked benevolently on. Then it would build a navy for the conquest of the rest of the world.
THE essential strategic characteristics of the world's present division between land power and sea power are a familiar picture to historians. One part of the globe is ruled by a great army, capable of marching across continents. The other part is dominated by the sea, and in turn dominates the seas. A famous example is the situation in the third century B.C., when the Republican armies of Rome faced Carthaginian sea power in the Mediterranean. The Romans learned how to build fleets and win battles at sea, and overwhelmed Carthage in three successive wars.
WE CANNOT rule out the possibility that Japan's present war against China may grow to involve the Soviet Union and even perhaps Germany. In that event there will come into play a new geopolitical factor which has improved Russia's strategical position in comparison with what it was in 1905 and in 1914. The Soviet Government's recent rapid development of navigation in, aviation above, and industrial enterprise along the shores of the Arctic Ocean has partly solved the age-old and crucial problem of Russia's precarious access to the great outside world.

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