HENRY M. WRISTON, President Emeritus of Brown University; Chairman of the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel, 1954-56; Executive Director of the American Assembly, Columbia University; author of "Strategy of Peace" and other works
THERE is a general impression that the Secretary of State travels too much. During three and a half years in office Mr. Dulles has gone a distance about equal to 11 times around the earth at the equator. He has visited 38 countries, several of them more than once.
Most of the comments about these relatively well-known facts tend to treat the travels of the Secretary as unique, something of a personal idiosyncrasy. Nothing could be further from the facts. It is indubitable that the Secretary likes his job, including the travel. Perhaps one should say especially the travel. Yet, despite his overpublicized totals he has not been absent as large a percentage of the time as some of his predecessors. James F. Byrnes was away from his desk about 62 percent of his year and a half in office; George C. Marshall had an "acting secretary" in his stead over 47 percent of his two-year tenure. Dean Acheson's record was close to 25 percent; Hull's was over 22 percent and Stettinius's was over 67 percent. Mr. Dulles has been represented by a substitute approximately 36 percent of his time as Secretary. It is clear from these figures that a new pattern of Secretarial conduct emerged before the present incumbent took office. The development is sufficiently important to warrant an inquiry into the underlying reasons and an evaluation of the consequences.[i]
Until this century the Secretary was absent only when ill or vacationing. If he engaged in negotiations abroad, he resigned, as John W. Foster did when he went to Paris to present the case of the United States in the Bering Sea controversy and as James R. Day did early in the McKinley administration to head the delegation in Paris to make peace with Spain...
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IT is surprising how little affected American strategic thinking has been by the fact that within just a few years the U.S.S.R. will have the capacity to deliver a powerful attack with nuclear weapons on the United States. To be sure, advocates of radical solutions propose to cut the Gordian knot by a policy of preventive war. But there has always been an air of unreality about a program so contrary to the sense of the country and the constitutional limits within which American foreign policy must be conducted.
DURING the Eisenhower Administration, the National Security Council has emerged as a mechanism of the executive branch of the federal government for advising the President on matters of high policy, equal in importance to the Cabinet. The solid establishment and effective functioning of this relatively new organ at the apex of government is a current phenomenon of America's political economy.
"POLICY," wrote Metternich, the Austrian minister who steered his country through 39 years of crisis by a tour de force perhaps never excelled, "is like a play in many acts which unfolds inevitably once the curtain is raised. To declare then that the play will not go on is an absurdity. The play will go on either by means of the actors or by means of the spectators who mount the stage. . . .

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