HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG, Editor of Foreign Affairs
"NEUTRALITY" means different things in different places and at different times. It can even mean different things in the same place and at approximately the same time. In a press conference on June 6, President Eisenhower defended the right of nations to be neutral and remarked that a decision to keep clear of military alliances could be accepted as natural and even prudent; on June 9, his Secretary of State said that neutrality is "an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, is an immoral and shortsighted conception." Within three days, that is, the United States Government issued two descriptions of what it thinks about neutrality, one of which surprised and annoyed our allies, the other of which annoyed the uncommitted states even though it did not surprise them. The explanations, restatements and revisions that followed did not matter except as ex post facto self-discipline; second thoughts seldom catch up with the first headlines.
Something more than a failure to compare and reconcile viewpoints was responsible. The President and Mr. Dulles were talking about different things. The President was speaking from his heart and, knowing more about human psychology than international law, was expressing his instinctive feelings about the relations between peoples, and especially weak and powerful peoples, in very general terms. Mr. Dulles, preoccupied with the conflicts of interest involved in specific problems of those relations as they lie today on his desk, was speaking within the practical confines of policy regarding them as it has been developed thus far.
That is not very far. The State Department is in a quandary, poised on a historic divide. Behind lie the broad trails of the past ten years, with markers recording the bold decisions that saved the world from imminent catastrophe--Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Berlin, NATO, Korea. These measures of succor or defense were very largely American in initiative and execution, and even if some of the beneficiaries received them with mixed feelings and even if other nations thought some of them reckless and provocative, they accomplished what we had to accomplish in that period--they checked the Communist advance and, in effect, won the first phase of the long holding operation called the cold war...
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THE Administration about to assume power in Washington will find our foreign relations in stalemate. To break it, they will have to fulfill psychological as well as political requirements both at home and abroad. Our people must be freed--helped, rather, to free themselves--from an oppressive sense of unreality, from the feeling that perhaps their great efforts since the end of the war and the sacrifices of their sons in Korea have not been directed to clear and practicable objectives.
IN the early years after the war, the Russians expanded their ideological exports while pursuing a policy of economic isolationism whenever more tangible goods were involved. Wherever they could make themselves heard, they challenged United States concepts of trade and aid as exploitation and imperialism, but they did not compete in substance. Within its own self-imposed limitations, American foreign economic policy was relatively free to engage in trade and aid with the countries not in the Soviet bloc.
LAST spring and early summer events transpired on the international stage which, if not finally judged to have been disastrous, must certainly be recorded as among the most disconcerting in the annals of American diplomacy.

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