A. M. ROSENTHAL, Correspondent of The New York Times in India
MOTHER INDIA. By Katherine Mayo. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927.
THE pictures that flash into a man's mind when he thinks of a foreign country or its people spring from an enormous variety of experiences--a movie or a song, a book read in childhood, a cartoon caricature, a painting or a college lecture, a travel poster or a newspaper feature story. For a generation or more, an American's mental image of France was quite closely tied to the Mademoiselle from Armentières. In the 1930s, in a certain block in New York City, to call a boy English was to call him a dandified sissy and invite what followed. There are millions of people throughout the world who, to the day they die, will see jackboots when they hear the word "Germany." A couple of years ago, a British moving picture director thought of the perfect way to make sure his audience immediately identified a well-dressed young woman as an American. Naturally, he had her snapping bubble gum when she came on-screen.
These flashing images, these quickly recognizable symbols or caricatures, obviously have a great deal to do with the attitude of a man or a country toward another country or its people. Even in this Era of the American Tourist, they are important, because it is easy and wonderfully comforting to find in a country what before you ever bought your ticket you were quite sure existed.
All this has to do with the American image of a country about which Americans seem to be thinking more than they have in the past--India. The political images of India are usually on the unpleasant side: Nehru sitting on a fence or shaking a finger in self-righteous lecture. The Indian Army occupying Kashmir in opposition to Pakistan (mental image: turbaned soldier standing shoulder to shoulder with a G.I.). V. K. Krishna Menon, ruffle-haired and sharp-featured, leaning into a microphone and saying something at least faintly nasty. Happy Russian leaders standing garlanded before hundreds of thousands of cheering Indians. But it is a fair guess that these political images of India occur in the minds of Americans a lot less frequently than the dramatic and usually horrible mental portraits that often can be traced back to, or at least symbolized by, a book published 30 years ago and detested in India to this day...
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"I felt like one who has inadvertently loosened a large boulder from the top of a cliff and now helplessly witnesses its path of destruction in the valley below, shuddering and wincing at each successive glimpse of disaster." So George F. Kennan described the consequences of having published in this journal, 30 years ago this month, the article which introduced the term "containment" to the world. Attributed only to a "Mr. X" in order to protect the author's position as Director of the State Department's new Policy Planning Staff, the article, entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," was nonetheless quickly revealed by Arthur Krock as having come from Kennan's pen. Ironically, its very anonymity assured it a conspicuousness Kennan's subsequent efforts to clarify his views never attained.
In the July 1977 issue of Foreign Affairs, which marked the thirtieth anniversary of the appearance in its pages of George F. Kennan's famous "X" article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," John Lewis Gaddis ambitiously attempted to resolve once and for all the seemingly interminable controversy that has surrounded Kennan's call for containment ever since that first public enunciation. Diplomatic historians doubtless noted with interest that Professor Gaddis contends, quite categorically, that the retrospective elucidation of containment found in the first volume of Kennan's Memoirs is wholly satisfactory with respect to what have been far and away its most controversial features: to wit, the assertions that the policy was "political" rather than "military," and that it was to be cautiously implemented within strictly defined geographical limits rather narrower than had commonly been supposed.
The term "strategy" needs continual definition. For most people, Clausewitz's formulation "the use of engagements for the object of the war," or, as Liddell Hart paraphrased it, "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy," is clear enough. Strategy concerns the deployment and use of armed forces to attain a given political objective. Histories of strategy, including Liddell Hart's own Strategy of Indirect Approach, usually consist of case studies, from Alexander the Great to MacArthur, of the way in which this was done. Nevertheless, the experience of the past century has shown this approach to be inadequate to the point of triviality. In the West the concept of "grand strategy" was introduced to cover those industrial, financial, demographic, and societal aspects of war that have become so salient in the twentieth century; in communist states all strategic thought has to be validated by the holistic doctrines of Marxism-Leninism.

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