HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of The New York Times; author of "The Price of Power," "Great Mistakes of the War" and "Power and Politics"
LAST fall's Suez crisis restored the Middle East to proper perspective in the war offices of the world. The strategic importance of this crossroads between continents and its relationship to the world conflict were again emphasized by the clash of arms in an area where man first raised sword to man. Oil, trade routes, geography and terrain, faith and ideology, all contribute to the strategic importance of the Middle East.
The Middle East oil fields, stretching in a great arc from Iran and Iraq around the Persian Gulf, comprise collectively the largest known petroleum deposits, approximating about two-thirds of the oil reserve of the free world. Access to this oil and use of it at reasonable prices cannot be termed "vital" to the United States. Western Hemisphere sources can supply United States needs, though costs would undoubtedly increase if the West were denied Middle East oil. For limited periods even Western Europe can get along without the "black gold" of Kuwait, Bahrein, Iran and Iraq. This was demonstrated during the past winter when alternative sources of supply and new routes were utilized. The Suez Canal was closed intermittently during World War II and would probably be closed during any future war. NATO's strategic planning cannot count upon use of Middle Eastern oil in another war and Western Europe--with United States help-- can probably fight without it. During limited periods of emergency the Western world can live without Middle East oil, and this fact is perhaps the strongest answer to political blackmail from any quarter...
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Robert and Isabelle Tombs' superb chronicle of 300 years of Anglo-French rivalry reveals how the love-hate relationship between France and the United Kingdom has left an indelible mark on today's world.
THE pacts of amity between the British Government and Sultan Ibn Saud, recently concluded at Bahra through Sir Gilbert Clayton, and the treaties subsequently concluded with the Imam Yahia of the Yemen, will not fail to leave their impress upon the development of Great Britain's future policy in the Middle East. Until now that policy has undergone numerous transformations without ever assuming a definite conclusive shape. Superficially, the Bahra agreements represent nothing unusual in the diplomatic relations between England and Arabia.
MUSSOLINI'S hope, like that of Stalin, has been to reap the rewards of victory without sharing in its risks. On June 10, 1940, it was logical enough for him to assume that these rewards would be his by a mere declaration of war against the Western Powers. Denmark, Norway and the Low Countries had been overrun by German troops, France was on the verge of collapse, and even the British Isles seemed wide open to Nazi invasion.

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