Nato: Deterrent or Shield?

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THE hard core of the West's military strength is its retaliatory forces. Their most powerful single element is the United States Strategic Air Command. . . .

In spite of the retaliatory forces, there remains the possibility that war could start because the enemy made an error in judgment or took some reckless or opportunistic action. Because of this chance--rather, mischance--we cannot omit or skimp at any point along our eastern frontiers the defense strength which the Soviet threat dictates. For if our line is not defended throughout, the enemy might trump up a pretext for crossing it. We would then face not only an accomplished fact, but also a dilemma: If we did not take immediate action, we would fail to meet the commitments of the Alliance; if we did take it, we would start a war.

On the other hand, if our line is being held in reasonable strength, and if the enemy knows this beyond doubt, then any inclination on his part to cross the line makes him face the terrible decision of detonating World War III, with a sure prospect of his own annihilation. The defensive forces deployed on our eastern boundary thus become an essential part of the deterrent.

--General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

IF one looks only at the second paragraph above, the case for sizable NATO ground forces seems to be based on a very understandable reluctance to initiate all-out atomic war: we need forces tailored for wars limited in scope and in the weapons employed. Then we can meet limited provocations without starting all-out atomic war...