Overseas Bases in American Strategy

THE present system of United States military bases overseas offers a striking contrast with the situation that existed a decade ago. At that time, we retained occupation forces in Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea, with very limited air and ground support facilities elsewhere overseas. A few troops remained in China and Trieste, but were being progressively withdrawn; and we had only three base agreements, in addition to simple transit rights at designated airfields in Iceland and Saudi Arabia. Today, United States forces are stationed in about 35 separate countries and territories, exclusive of additional areas where our military representation is confined to training and advisory missions. Slightly more than one million Americans, including military dependents and civilian employees, are involved in our military activities overseas, and expenditures for the maintenance of these forces and installations are putting more than two billion dollars into local economies each year.

While the swift growth of this base system has not been distinguished by a pristine clarity of purpose, it has in fact proceeded logically and pragmatically from our assumption of a progressively greater responsibility for the military and political security of the non-Communist world. The base system reflects fundamentally our decision to assure the effectiveness of the strategic deterrent, but also our decisions to organize and sustain the NATO alliance, to maintain strong naval forces in Mediterranean waters, to support a collective security system in Southeast Asia, to protect Japan and Korea, to safeguard Taiwan. These decisions in turn have emerged over the past decade from the mounting pressure of the Sino-Soviet threat, from the very great disparity between United States power and the power of our overseas allies, and from an underlying awareness of the suicidal consequences of retreat into "Fortress America."

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