Supervising Agreements: the Korean Experience
JACQUES FREYMOND, Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, and Professor of History; author of "De Roosevelt à Eisenhower" and other works.
IN the present world of distrust and fear, where we apparently must accept a bellicose form of coexistence as a substitute for peace, the problem of how to supervise the implementation of international agreements assumes great importance. Not a day goes by without some reference to it, whether in the context of partial or general disarmament or in discussions of the Middle East or "disengagement" in Europe. This may justify a study of a recent experience in international supervision--that of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission set up under the terms of the Armistice Agreement in Korea.
It will be recalled that the Armistice Agreement concluded at Panmunjom in July 1953 provided for the establishment of a Military Armistice Commission, composed of representatives of the two belligerents, and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which was "to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection and investigation." The latter was to consist of representatives of four nations which, to the extent that they had not participated in the war, could be considered neutral--two of them (Sweden and Switzerland) appointed by the United Nations Command and the other two (Poland and Czechoslovakia) by the North Korean-Chinese Command.
The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was primarily to see that both sides adhered to their agreement not to strengthen their military forces, either by increasing their personnel or by bringing in more advanced weapons. To accomplish this, the Armistice Agreement provided for 20 Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, five to be stationed at ports of entry in South Korea, five at ports of entry in North Korea and the balance held in reserve in the Demilitarized Zone. These ten unassigned Teams could be sent anywhere to investigate reported violations, at the request of "the Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof." These responsibilities of the Supervisory Commission, although strictly circumscribed, appeared to be clearly defined and capable of execution. The means placed at its disposal should have enabled it to supervise the movements of personnel and matériel at the ten designated ports of entry and, upon the request of either side, to dispatch the mobile Teams to conduct investigations at designated points...
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