HENRY A. KISSINGER, Associate Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs; author of "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy"
THESE lines are being written while the Foreign Ministers' Conference is still in progress. But even though its precise outcome cannot be foretold, the general nature of the diplomacy of the next few months is apparent. The West has presented a "package" proposal linking German unification to European security. This link has been rejected. The Soviet Union has insisted that German reunification should be left to the two German states and that the conference should concentrate on the issues which the Soviet leaders have defined as "soluble." It is clear, then, that the Western powers are to be tested in their negotiation skill, their creativity and, most important, their convictions. Their response will influence importantly, perhaps crucially, the future of freedom in our time.
It is hoped that the Western performance in the months ahead will be more self-assured than that in the period just past. In an alliance, disagreements are unavoidable and different approaches may contribute to the vitality of a consensus finally achieved. Since in democracies policies are dependent on popular support, they are usually developed by a public debate which stresses conflicting approaches. Even bearing this in mind, we have reason for concern. The West's reaction to a clear Soviet menace to the very vitals of the Western alliance has been tentative and irresolute. More of the debate has dealt with what could be conceded than with the goals for which we should strive. The hesitation shown in developing the Western "package" does not augur well that it will be maintained with resolution. If the proposals presented at Geneva are valid today, one wonders why we lacked the imagination to present them before Soviet pressure made them appear as an improvisation to escape a difficult situation.
Nothing is more important for the West than to become clear about the causes of the present instability and to develop real conviction about the measures which it proposes for overcoming it. These measures may or may not prove negotiable. But it would be perilous to confuse the elements of stability with the terms on which the Soviet Union may be willing to settle. In our desire for agreement we must not lose sight of the issues at stake or of the goals for which to strive...
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THE first steps towards three-Power planning for the occupation and control of Germany after her eventual defeat were taken at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943. In those days the Red Army was continuing its powerful advance against the German armies (Kiev was liberated during the Conference), and the forces of the Western Allies were preparing their tremendous attack upon Hitler's "Fortress Europe." The need for coördinating the political planning of the major Allies thus became more and more obvious and acute. During Mr.
DURING World War II, the idea of punishing Germany for obeying Hitler to the end and supporting the Nazi bid for world domination found strong backing. Many influential Allied leaders felt that the most telling reprisal could be inflicted on her by decreeing her dismemberment. This feeling reached its high point at the Yalta Conference. There a provision for dismemberment was added to the surrender instrument previously prepared for German signature, and a secret committee was established to study and report on the steps necessary for carrying the plan into execution.
ALLIED policy in Germany still is formally governed by the Potsdam agreement, though every day that passes increases the doubt whether this agreement can and will be implemented. Why is this the case, and what can we do about it? The danger of a breakdown of Four Power collaboration in Germany is so alarming that our examination of the alternatives still open to the United States should be stated in the most factual terms.
The principal economic provisions of the Potsdam agreement were as follows:

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