The "China Problem" Reconsidered

IN the autumn of 1949, after 22 years of bitter and protracted struggle, Mao Tse-tung and his Red armies finally established Communist rule over mainland China. The initial American reaction was division and confusion. It has remained so to this day. We still are certain only of what we will not do about China. We will not give formal recognition to the government in Peking. We will not agree to Chinese Communist membership in the United Nations.

For too long now we have remained at the mercy of events set in motion by leaders in Taipei and Peking. We have neglected to make constructive use of the periods of uneasy calm between recurrent crises. We have failed to take into account adequately the long-range forces which seem certain to shape future developments. Has the time not come to face the fundamental realities of our "China problem"? Until we do, we shall continue to be severely hampered in our relations with all of Asia.

Under present conditions, debate over recognition of Communist China by the United States is largely a dead-end street. If we should propose an exchange of ambassadors, Mao Tse-tung would surely ask if our recognition extended to Communist sovereignty over "the Province of Formosa." And when we replied that it did not, his response would inevitably be a contemptuous refusal of our offer. A similar outcome can be predicted if we proposed that "both Chinas" be admitted to the United Nations. Chiang Kai-shek would also reject such a proposal. The stalemate would persist.

This means that the two primary questions which have caused such deep discord here in America are not at the moment solvable. At some later stage we may find it useful to test the peaceful intentions of the Chinese Communists by proposing that both sides accept a situation which neither we nor they can alter short of war. But until then, let us bypass the question of formal relationships and focus on the immediate and, perhaps, obtainable...

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