MOHAMMED AYUB KHAN, President of Pakistan; former Commander in Chief, Pakistani Army; Minister of Defense, 1954-55
I AM not sure if the peculiar strains which confronted Pakistan immediately on its emergence as a free state are adequately understood.
The first strain was ideological. It is a common fallacy to believe that the concept of Pakistan was formed in a poet's dream. The poet, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, was no idle dreamer. Nor can countries like Pakistan (364,737 square miles; population 80,000,000) spring from the nebulous realm of poetry alone. Iqbal was in fact a philosopher of traditional as well as modern thought who had made a careful study of human affairs, both East and West, and focussed the light of his inquiry on the causes of economic and cultural subjugation to which the Muslims of India had been systematically subjected since their first abortive struggle for independence in 1857. It was in his presidential address to the annual session of All-India Muslim League in 1930 that he spelt out the broad outlines of a plan under which the Muslims of India were led to aspire to an independent state in which they would be free to follow their own way of life.
The All-India Muslim League based its Charter on this idea and, under the leadership of Qaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, launched a struggle which culminated in the establishment of Pakistan in August 1947.
Iqbal's thesis that in their free state the Muslims were to practice their own way of life posed an ideological problem which was not easy to handle. On one hand, there were many outside Pakistan who charged us with planning to establish an obdurate theocracy in the mediæval sense of the term. On the other, most of us within Pakistan itself were not quite clear how to go about welding our spiritual ideals into the business of statecraft. The result was a great deal of loose groping which infected our politics and our intellect alike...
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IT is nearly ten years since Pakistan became an ally of the West. In May 1954, Pakistan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States. Later in that year it became a member of SEATO along with the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. A year later, it joined the Baghdad Pact, another mutual defense organization, with Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The United States has not joined this organization, but has remained closely associated with it since its inception. In 1958, when Iraq left this pact, it was renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organization): it continued to comprise Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as its regional members. Early in 1959, Pakistan signed (as did Turkey and Iran) a bilateral Agreement of Coöperation with the United States, which was designed further to reinforce the defensive purposes of CENTO.
Since independence, India's nuclear policy has been to seek either global disarm ament or equal security for all. The old nonproliferation regime was discriminatory, ratifying the possession of nuclear weapons for the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council while preaching to the nuclear have-nots about the virtues of disarmament. India was left sandwiched between two nuclear weapons powers, Pakistan and a rising China. The end of the Cold War has not ushered in an era where globalization and trade trump old-fashioned security woes. If nuclear deterrence works in the West, why won't it work in India?
India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests last May were a double setback: for security on the subcontinent and worldwide nonproliferation efforts. U.S. attempts to forge warmer relations with both countries were also casualties of the blasts. The tests could spark a chain of withdrawals from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, undermining the international consensus against the spread of nuclear arms. Cold War brinkmanship is no model for diplomacy. For their sake as well as the world's, India and Pakistan need to stabilize their nuclear rivalry at the lowest possible level, ban further tests, and embrace frequent, high-level bilateral talks to ease tensions.

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