Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack

IN THE past, a nation's security was guaranteed essentially by its military power. Though proposals for disarmament were made from time to time, particularly after World War I, there was an air of unreality about them. In the era of what we now call conventional weapons, the force-in-being was not nearly so significant as the industrial potential and the mobilization base. A country planning to attack had to engage in extended preparations very difficult to hide. Technology was relatively stable. Travel was unrestricted. Since surprise was not so crucial, and since victory could generally be achieved only through a prolonged mobilization of resources after a war had started, the contribution which arms control might make to stability seemed marginal. Armaments, it was then correctly said, were the symptom and not the cause of tension. The best method of achieving a stable peace was to remove the causes of political conflict.

Although this remains true today, physical conditions have basically altered. Technology is volatile. The advantage of surprise can be overwhelming. The forces-in-being are almost surely decisive--at least in all-out war. A major cause of instability is the very rate of technological change. Every country lives with the nightmare that even if it puts forth its best efforts its survival may be jeopardized by a technological breakthrough on the part of its opponent. It knows also that every invention opens up the prospect of many others. No country can protect itself against all the technological possibilities increasingly open to its opponents. Conversely, an advantage once achieved will produce a powerful incentive to exploit it, for the scientific revolution which made it possible also insures that it will be transitory...

This is a premium article

You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.

Buy PDF

Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.