JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, Professor of Economics, Harvard University; recently economic adviser to the President; visiting lecturer in Asia for the Department of State, 1957; author of "The Affluent Society," "Study Guide on Modern Far Eastern History" and other political and economic works
IT IS now nearly 12 years since the provision of economic assistance to other countries on a regular and organized basis became an established feature of American foreign policy. Such assistance had previously been offered to Latin American countries and during and after the war to the devastated and distressed countries of Europe and Asia. With the promulgation of the Point IV offer in President Truman's Inaugural Message of 1949, the provision of assistance to other countries for their economic development lost its character of emergency relief. It became, instead, a settled arrangement for helping the less fortunate countries of the world to escape from poverty and to place themselves on a path to self-sustaining growth. The amounts being spent, if not huge, have at least become considerable: in the current fiscal year some $1.7 billion is available for loans, grants, technical assistance and administrative costs, and another $1.2 billion in surplus food and fiber. In addition, $250 million is provided for investment guarantees and $130 million for multilateral aid through the United Nations.
From the beginning, foreign aid has been sharply controversial. It has an aspect of goodwill and compassion that naturally arouses grave suspicion. Liberals, reacting to this, come automatically to its defense. Any criticism has been deemed to conceal some design for discrediting the policy. If results are not satisfactory, it is because we are not spending enough. The normal liberal formula for improving foreign aid is to spend about 25 percent more.
A much more careful view of foreign aid is now in order and, indeed, essential. Such a view does not lead to the conclusion that less should be spent. More money will be needed. But it does lead to the conclusion that much recent and present aid has been very ineffectually employed and for that reason has had gravely disappointing or even negative results. Without a substantial change in the whole view of economic development, the results in most cases will continue to be disappointing. The required changes will not perhaps be easily accepted here or abroad. Yet so great is the need for development and also the desire for it that we should not discount too severely the willingness to take the necessary steps...
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A look back at perhaps the most important foreign policy success of the postwar period. Edited by Peter Grose, with contributions by historians Diane B. Kunz and David Reynolds, a memoir by Charles P. Kindleberger, a profile of Marshall and Acheson by James Chace and one of Will Clayton by Gregory Fossedal and Bill Mikhail. And reflections from Roy Jenkins, Walt Rostow, and Helmut Schmidt.
A look back at perhaps the most important foreign policy success of the postwar period. Edited by Peter Grose, with contributions by historians Diane B. Kunz and David Reynolds, a memoir by Charles P. Kindleberger, a profile of Marshall and Acheson by James Chace and one of Will Clayton by Gregory Fossedal and Bill Mikhail. And reflections from Roy Jenkins, Walt Rostow, and Helmut Schmidt.
A look back at perhaps the most important foreign policy success of the postwar period. Edited by Peter Grose, with contributions by historians Diane B. Kunz and David Reynolds, a memoir by Charles P. Kindleberger, a profile of Marshall and Acheson by James Chace and one of Will Clayton by Gregory Fossedal and Bill Mikhail. And reflections from Roy Jenkins, Walt Rostow, and Helmut Schmidt.

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