Charles Gati

Although the intoxication of the revolutions of 1989 has been followed by painful realizations of the pervasive legacy of the communist period (attitudes, bureaucracy), the West should remain optimistic that long-term objectives for economic revitalization can be achieved.

Soviet writings on the future of Eastern Europe acknowledge a failure of Soviet policy as well as poor leadership in the countries concerned. Yet Moscow still regards the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia as having been provoked by the West. Assesses the prospects for Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Concludes with comments on the US position and the possibilities for co-operation with the USSR over the future of Eastern Europe.

Try to imagine, as Western specialists in communist affairs often do, a Politburo meeting in the Kremlin. It is the spring of 1981, the topic is Poland. Comrade A is impatient: "I thought Kania was one of us. He used to be in charge of their security forces. How is it he doesn't know what to do?" Comrade B is philosophical: "These Poles, they've never liked us, they never will. We liberate them from the Germans, we sell them cheap oil, we give them credit, we buy everything they can't sell in the West. What do we get? Why aren't they grateful?" Comrade C is bitter: "I'm sick and tired of all these East Europeans, but especially of the Poles. They want to be the ‘bridge' between us and the West. (Laughter in the room.) Don't they know we want the West Germans to be the ‘bridge'?" (More laughter.) Comrade D is business-like: "We have better things to do than to worry about Poland all the time. I move that we give this Kania fellow another chance. If he doesn't have everything under control by the end of the year, we'll move in. We'll call it ‘fraternal assistance.' Enough is enough. What will the Americans and the Chinese think of us if we let this thing go on indefinitely? We're patient, of course. We're always patient, but we're not a paper tiger!" The motion carries.

During the almost six decades that have passed since the Russian Revolution of 1917, two contradictory qualities have distinguished the international communist movement. One has been the persistent Soviet effort to subordinate the interests of foreign communist parties to those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); the other has been the equally persistent effort of these parties to resist such "Sovietization" and, in the process, to question Moscow's leading role in world communism. Now, in the aftermath of last summer's Conference of European Communist Parties in Berlin, a third tendency may be observed in the international relations of the communist movement - the prospective export of what has come to be known as "Eurocommunism" from West to East, signifying a historic shift in the direction of influence and initiative within world communism.