Gary G. Sick

Focuses on the domestic political underpinnings of Iran's foreign policy behaviour in respect of (1) the war against Iraq, the course of which is decided by the struggle between the professional military and the Revolutionary Guards (2) its US policy, in which relations with the Great Satan were improved only to gain arms supplies for the war effort. The scandal which rocked confidence in President Reagan was caused by details of the secret agreement being leaked by radicals in the Iranian cabinet who felt that they were losing out to the moderates led by Rafsanjani (3) its Soviet policy, in which revolutionary purity caused the closure of the communist Tudeh party and arrest of its members, and has led to negligible trade with its most powerful neighbour. Iran obtained spares for its Soviet-built power station in exchange for helping release Soviet hostages in Lebanon which were taken by Shia militia backed and organized by Iran (4) its policy with its Persian Gulf neighbours, whom Iran has intimidated by threatening to spread the revolution to the region's Shias (estimated at 60% of the Gulf population), to destroy the Gulf's oilfields, and, by uncovering the US arms-for-hostages deal, to make them doubtful of US support. Concludes that Iran (1) has seemed flexible enough to make gains in all its foreign policy objectives (2) is doggedly creating 'clericalism in one country' even at the expense of greater advantages with the superpowers and its regional neighbours (3) as a result, if Iran wins the war, it will become the region's dominant power.