Henry A. Kissinger

The passions aroused by the attempt to extradite Augusto Pinochet highlight the many unresolved issues in the movement to enforce global justice. Widespread agreement that human rights violations and crimes against humanity must be prosecuted has hindered active consideration of the proper role of international courts. Universal jurisdiction risks creating universal tyranny -- that of judges.

After Richard Nixon's 1972 re-election, a new political force -- the neoconservatives, former anti-Nixon liberals now bent on total victory over the Soviet Union -- emerged to undermine his diplomacy. Nixon and his heir, Gerald Ford, sought to carefully wear the Soviets down, but the neocons yearned to vanquish communism with a burst of ideological elan. The new right's insistence on smearing detente as appeasement led them to ignore subtle Soviet encroachments and abandon Ford when he urged Congress to aid Indochina and Angola. The neocons undercut the real foreign policy debate, which was between the White House and the liberals.

The West must change its grand strategy in the face of changing Soviet presence in the world order. "Passivity or -- worse -- a posture of delayed and uncoordinated reaction to Soviet initiatives would enable the Kremlin to define the East-West agenda and serve primarily Soviet interests". Soviet reformism is driven by a sense of approaching crisis, and is ready to accept fundamental changes in domestic and foreign policy. Nevertheless, the USSR will maintain the contest with the USA where it can: "certain aspects of current Soviet policy, especially in Europe, are consistent with this long-term objective". The democracies must learn to cope with the Soviet flurry of unilateral initiatives, and to sift the genuine concessions from the propaganda. Reviews the issues in (1) strategic arms control, recommending a greater attention to linkage with larger security policy goals (2) the future of Eastern Europe, recommending the devising of "a category of association with the European Community based on article 238 of the Treaty of Rome" (3) the nature, extent and timing of the economic aid which might be extended to the USSR to promote desirable reform (4) encouraging an acceptable Soviet policy towards the Asia-Pacific region (5) human rights. Predicts that "the competitive relationship between East and West will not disappear... an overall reconciliation of conflicting interests is still a long-term objective". Sets out various 'checkpoints' for assessing Western progress in achieving a more conciliatory foreign policy in these areas. This portrayal of Soviet state action and interests by three top-flight statesmen of the non-communist world, is one of organic and well-integrated policy, carefully calculated to retain maximum advantage in an adverse strategic situation. It shows no anticipation of internal instability, even as late as mid-1989. Those political scientists anguished at the 'failure' of their discipline to anticipate the Soviet collapse can draw some comfort from this equally miserable performance.

For several years now disputes have rent the Atlantic Alliance. They have focused on such issues as nuclear strategy and control, the organization of Europe and the nature of an Atlantic Community. However, the most fundamental issue in Atlantic relationships is raised by two questions not unlike those which each Western society has had to deal with in its domestic affairs: How much unity do we want? How much pluralism can we stand? Too formalistic a conception of unity risks destroying the political will of the members of the Community. Too absolute an insistence on national particularity must lead to a fragmentation of the common effort.