James Dobbins

The U.S. mission in Afghanistan suffers from a lack of common objectives among U.S. agencies, argue Randy George and Dante Paradiso. What the war needs is a single commander to unite civilian and military efforts, they write. Not so, replies James Dobbins: Washington should be loath to move away from its tradition of civilian control of the armed forces.

A discussion on the the theory and practice of state building. Can and should the United States commit to building up institutions in weak states?

These two books are distinct but complementary accounts of the months following the March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, when the optimists saw their hopes for a new democracy dashed by violence and chaos.

This study of U.S. nation-building efforts in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq both challenges and confirms Churchill's approach, where winning the war first was the most important task.

The current debate over the United States' failures in Iraq needs to go beyond bumper-sticker conclusions -- no more preemption, no more democracy promotion, no more nation building -- and acrimonious finger-pointing. Only by carefully considering where U.S. leaders, institutions, and policies have been at fault can valuable lessons be learned and future debacles avoided.

In this special Web-only feature, Stephen Biddle, Larry Diamond, James Dobbins, and Leslie Gelb analyze the report of the Iraq Study Group and debate what should be done in Iraq.