American foreign policy is changing, but the machinery of government is not changing with it. As we try to enter what President Nixon has called an era of negotiation, it is time to ask whether the nation is well served by the immense foreign affairs bureaucracies that have grown up in Washington over the past quarter-century. Could institutional reform give new coherence to our foreign policy? How these questions are answered may well determine the success or failure of American diplomacy in the seventies.
Twelve hundred miles south of Suez a struggle to control the farther entrance to the Red Sea is well underway. Though naturally overshadowed by the Arab-Israeli conflict to which it is not unrelated, the contest to the south involves substantial issues for great and small powers alike, who look to the future of the African Horn and the Red Sea basin. More than this, the problem of Eritrea, together with the related question of French Djibouti's future, is an intriguing one which, for all its complexities, recorded in past United Nations resolutions and every kind of East-West, North-South compromise, still may prove soluble short of major war. For the armed struggle along the Red Sea's southern rim is thus far a conflict of subdued violence and muted, if bizarre, ramifications.
