Since the United States first became a global superpower, it has been fashionable to speak of its decline. But in today's world, the United States' economic and military strength, along with the attractiveness of its ideals, will ensure its power for a long time to come.
In American Vertigo, Bernard-Henri Lévy updates Tocqueville and defends the United States against anti-Americanism, while in Überpower, Josef Joffe counsels Washington on how to maintain its primacy.
Stephen D. Krasner takes a hard look at the old idea that states are unfettered actors. Sovereignty has never been absolute, but it is still a useful lens for viewing the world.
Foreign minister in some of the most pivotal years of the Cold War, Hans-Dietrich Genscher became a master of equivocation. Unfortunately, as an author, he still is.
Somehow the United States has remained unchallenged despite victory. Defying the laws of realpolitik, no one is ganging up on the hegemon. Through two world wars, the United States practiced a strategy like Britain's, remaining aloof from international troubles, stepping in only to rectify the balance of power. Today the United States is more like Bismarck's Germany, developing alliances with everyone so that ganging up against it is impossible. But it will have to keep providing order and security for others. Only by doing good can it do well.
Suspicions that Germany, actually staid and boring, is secretly polishing ye olde jackboots underlies Jacob Heilbrunn's woefully out-of-date reportage on the German new right. Heilbrunn replies to Joffe and other critics.
German reunification ranks high on George Bush's impressive list of foreign policy achievements. Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice's engaging account reveals how American leadership won the day.
Liberated from the Cold War, European nationalism ran rampant in 1992. The absence of a compelling strategic interest in war-torn Yugoslavia precluded foreign intervention, and "an absurd replay of yesteryear's battles" found newly unified Germany on the side of the former Hapsburg states, with Britain, France and the United States tacitly backing Serbia. To attract the capital for east German reconstruction, Germany chose to raise its interest rates, scuttling the powerless European Monetary System. A rise in fascist street-fighting and widespread hypernationaliism inspired mass demonstrations of German tolerance and liberalism.
Transatlantic disaffections, sturdy perennials since the turn of the decade, continued to sprout luxuriantly throughout 1982. They were nourished by two as yet inchoate forces which, if unchecked, will logically lead to the end of alliance: the trends toward neutralism in Europe and toward unilateralism in America.
