Lawrence D. Freedman

In a field dominated by apocalyptic warnings, Mueller speaks up for complacency.

This thoroughly researched and always interesting book not only adds intriguing detail to the interplay between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s and gives due recognition to the role of Margaret Thatcher and British intelligence; it also breaks new ground by getting inside the dark and obsessive parts of the Soviet military machine.

Koblentz provides an up-to-date and comprehensive analysis of biological weapons as a strategic problem that should become the standard text in the field. One point he makes on how biodefense programs might advance offensive knowledge is fully developed in the forceful analysis by Klotz and Sylvester, whose message is contained in its subtitle: that U.S. efforts at biodefense are counterproductive.

Pointing to the way the Soviet nuclear program was structured, Gordin questions whether Soviet spies and captured German scientists made as much of a difference to the timing of the Soviet atomic bomb project as is often assumed.

This book is a welcome and compelling portrayal not only of Schriever but also of the bureaucratic tussles and engineering challenges behind the missile and space programs of the 1950s and 1960s.

Rublee is interested in why countries that could have acquired nuclear weapons chose not to, whereas Paul considers why those that chose to acquire them have not used them.

For over two decades, Blight, Lang, and Welch have used oral history to illuminate the key decisions taken by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations on Cuba and Vietnam.

World Politics Since 1945 remains one of the best overviews of contemporary international history, full of elegant writing and shrewd judgement.

Cortright's thorough and thoughtful discussion of the ideas and movements that have associated themselves with the word "peace" deserves a wide audience and covers a lot of ground on the origins of key concepts, the roles of religion and international law, and the continuing struggle against charges of cowardice and a lack of patriotism.

Goldstein has used McGeorge Bundy's notes and a number of detailed interviews to provide a compelling and sympathetic, although hardly uncritical, account of the grave mistakes that were made in the run-up to and during the Vietnam War.

This is a fascinating collection of case studies of instances in which regular forces have found themselves trying to cope with armed groups that have occupied holy places, mainly mosques (in Iraq, Islamabad, Kashmir, Mecca, and Thailand) but also one church (in Bethlehem) and a temple (in Amritsar, India).