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In his thorough exploration of why and how foreign fighters get involved in wars far away from their homes, Malet focuses on the importance of transnational identity.
This curious book addresses what Scarry describes as the incompatibility of nuclear weapons and democracy.
Ginsberg’s book is a direct challenge to the optimism of the celebrated cognitive neuroscientist Steven Pinker, whose 2011 book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, argued that violence is playing a diminishing role in human affairs.
Martin van Creveld's latest book provides a history of war games, which he defines very broadly to include almost any activity that links play and conflict.
In addition to providing new insights into the debate over missile defense, Slayton raises valuable questions about the broader interaction between scientific expertise and advocacy.
Castner commanded an explosive ordnance disposal unit in Iraq. His style is gripping, and the book is surprisingly informative about the history and practice of bomb disposal, but it is also chaotic, as he moves back and forth between his wartime experiences and his later struggles to cope with PTSD, which he refers to as his “Crazy.”
In this thoughtful meditation on technology and ethics, Riza, a fighter pilot and colonel in the U.S. Air Force, worries that robotics make it easier to go to war.
Kilcullen argues that most future conflicts will occur in cities, thanks to the extraordinary growth in urban populations and the interconnectedness wrought by new technologies, which will create novel opportunities for crime and political violence.
In this terrific book, Farmelo tells the story of the United Kingdom’s nuclear program, which began with pioneering work in Cambridge before World War II and ultimately merged with the United States’ Manhattan Project.
Terrorist organizations are no different from other political entities, except that their resources tend to be as meager as their ambitions are huge
Although U.S. forces are now out of Iraq and are quickly withdrawing from Afghanistan, debate still rages over counterinsurgency (COIN) and the concept of “winning hearts and minds.” These three books look at the different sides of the COIN.
These three books illuminate different aspects of World War II using diaries, letters, and memoirs to capture what the war meant for people caught up in it.
Three new books on counterterrorism cover new ground, focusing on U.S. drone policy; the "lone wolf" terrorist; and counterterrorist financing.
This elegantly produced collection tells the story of modern warfare, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Gavin is concerned that U.S. nuclear policy is distorted by myths about the past, and he believes that a better understanding of the history of the nuclear age would improve the contemporary approach.
Wirtz and Lavoy assembled top experts to consider which countries might go nuclear next. Solingen’s team makes the case for using both sticks and carrots but notes that positive incentives are harder to design.
Three short, sad books report on the effects of war on those who fight.
O’Connell, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, analyzes the development of the corps’ culture from World War II to the Vietnam era.
This superb book is Kennedy’s best. His simple but striking proposition is that the Allied victory rested not only on the work of grand strategists in presidential cabinets and high military commands but also on the efforts of middle managers, such as the logisticians, engineers, and operational analysts who addressed the major obstacles to success.
In narrating the history of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Gordon and Trainor finish the job they started in Cobra II, their 2006 book on the origins of the Iraq war. Their Iraqi and American sources are extraordinary, allowing them to describe events with an enormous, and sometimes overwhelming, amount of detail.
Boot's conclusions confirm that although guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists have had their successes, the strong normally prevail over the weak. Invisible armies work best when they are able to build up visible political support and link up with (or become) even more visible conventional forces.
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