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Betts is by no means a lone voice arguing for American restraint, but he is certainly among the most articulate.
Three recent books on national security and the politics of intelligence assessments.
Knaus writes about Bosnia, a relatively successful case of international intervention. Stewart mocks formulaic approaches to intervention and rejects almost all policy prescriptions for Afghanistan other than extracting foreign troops as soon and as gracefully as possible.
Are terrorists mad, bad, or a combination of the two?
Beetle is a major contribution to the history of World War II. From Smith's vantage point, one sees the defeat of Germany in a new light.
In this meticulous study, Daddis reviews the U.S. Army’s search for a winning strategy in Vietnam and its attempts to evaluate its performance.
Miscamble argues that there was no reason to suppose that Japan was close to surrender prior to the bombing, that the bombing turned the debate in Tokyo in favor of surrender, and that the grim calculus of war suggested that if the atom bombs had not been used, many more would have died than were killed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Zakheim traces the current travails in Afghanistan to a failure to convert the military successes of late 2001 into political gains that would aid the larger goal of nation building.
Gerges, one of the most astute chroniclers of Islamist radicalism, begins his book with a masterly and trenchant account of the origins of al Qaeda and its decline after 9/11. Warrick, a reporter for The Washington Post, narrates an extraordinary story of intrigue and betrayal behind one operation in the war on terror.
Getting to Zero contains plenty of unavoidable skepticism, and readers will not finish it sure about the way ahead, but the book moves the debate to a more serious level.
Coming 50 years after 1961, with Berlin now the capital of a unified German state, Kempe’s compelling, lively (and unusually well-illustrated) account is a reminder that the city was once at the heart of a crisis that almost turned the Cold War hot.
Whereas Orsini manages to paint a disturbing portrait of a vicious group, Miniter looks at one of the key figures in al Qaeda, Khalid Sheik Mohammed.
As Byman reminds readers in this comprehensive, balanced, and sharply written history, Jewish militants relied on force from the start to push the British out and keep the Arabs at bay.
In Triumph Revisited, Wiest and Doidge explain why the standard explanations for the United States' failure in Vietnam -- its exaggerated Cold War fears, its hopeless client, and its incoherent strategy -- remain compelling. Anderson, who contributes a fair and considered chapter to Triumph Revisited, is also the editor of The Columbia History of the Vietnam War.
A new book from Van Creveld is always something to be savored. There have been many previous histories of airpower, but none so comprehensive and sensitive to context as this one.
These two books address the threat of nuclear war, and, in particular, the possibility and morality of second-strike capability.
In Unwarranted Influence, Ledbetter traces how Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex" speech came about and charts its later influences, refuting those who claimed it sank without trace. A companion piece from the same period is a reprint of Ekirch's 1956 book The Civilian and the Military.
These two biographies and one autobiography cover twentieth-century U.S. military history.
Bergen is one of the most intelligent and informed chroniclers of al Qaeda, and in his latest book, he narrates the long-running conflict between that group and the West.
Heuser's history of strategic theory and practice demonstrates extraordinary range, erudition, intelligence, and insight. She appears to have read everything, in many languages, about attempts to apply armed force effectively.
Horowitz has written a scholarly analysis of why some governments enthusiastically embrace military innovations while others miss out.
Andreas and Greenhill's book is not the first to warn of the misuse of statistics of conflict -- and given the deep-rooted nature of the tendency it addresses, it will not be the last -- but it does so comprehensively.
Starting with World War I and ending with the Iraq war (and with clear implications for the war in Afghanistan), Rose shows how confused political leaders often are about exactly what they are trying to achieve in the coming peace.
The Invisible Harry Gold and Eyes in the Sky are two very different spy stories, but they share a common theme: the nuclear arms race that was already under way during World War II, as both the United States and the Soviet Union worked on atomic bombs, and then intensified, along with the Cold War, during the 1950s.
Millett believes that the Korean War has not been given its due place in contemporary international history. It has been overshadowed by World War II before it and the Vietnam War after it. Yet as Millett’s extensive bibliographical essay demonstrates, there is no shortage of material on the course and conduct of the war, and he seems to have read all of it.
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