Michael Scott Doran

Response
Jul/Aug
2011
Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic Wehrey; Michael Scott Doran

Iran may hope to capitalize on the Arab Spring, write Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic Wehrey, but Tehran will find the region hard to manipulate. Maybe so, argues Michael Doran -- but Washington must still do what it can to counter Iranian influence.

Comment
May/June
2011
Michael Scott Doran

Not since the Suez crisis and the Nasser-fueled uprisings of the 1950s has the Middle East seen so much unrest. Understanding those earlier events can help the United States navigate the crisis today -- for just like Nasser, Iran and Syria will try to manipulate various local grievances into a unified anti-Western campaign.



This article appears in the Foreign Affairs/CFR eBook, The New Arab Revolt.

Postscript
Michael Scott Doran

Doran's postscript to his January/February 2003 essay "Palestine, Iraq, and American Strategy"

Essay
Jan/Feb
2004
Michael Scott Doran

Saudi Arabia is in the throes of a crisis, but its elite is bitterly divided on how to escape it. Crown Prince Abdullah leads a camp of liberal reformers seeking rapprochement with the West, while Prince Nayef, the interior minister, sides with an anti-American Wahhabi religious establishment that has much in common with al Qaeda. Abdullah cuts a higher profile abroad -- but at home Nayef casts a longer and darker shadow.

Postscript
Michael Scott Doran

Doran's postscript to his January/February 2003 essay "Palestine, Iraq, and American Strategy."

Essay
Jan/Feb
2003
Michael Scott Doran

Many critics argue that the Bush administration should put off a showdown with Saddam Hussein and focus instead on achieving a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But they fail to understand that although Palestine is central to the symbolism of Arab politics, it is actually marginal to its substance. Now, as in 1991, if a road to a calmer situation in Palestine does in fact exist, it runs through Baghdad.

Essay
Jan/Feb
2002
Michael Scott Doran

Osama bin Laden's attacks on the United States were aimed at another audience: the entire Muslim world. Hoping that U.S. retaliation would unite the faithful against the West, bin Laden sought to spark revolutions in Arab nations and elsewhere. War with America was never his end; it was just a means to promote radical Islam. The sooner Washington understands this, the better its chances of winning the wider struggle.